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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
OTIS B. KIRK,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
vs.
PEGGIE M. KIRK,
Defendant, Appellee.

I
I BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I
I District Court No. 924901709
I
I Court of Appeals No. 940067-CA
I
I Priority Classification: 15
I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "appellant" or "Mr. Kirk") submits the
following as his brief of Appellant herein:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is domestic relations appeal from a final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce and denial of the Appellant's Motion for New Trial or in
the Alternative, to Alter and Amend the Decree of Divorce.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered
on October 18, 1993 after a trial held on March 4, 9, and 23, 1993.
The Appellant filed a Motion for new trial or in the alternative, to alter and
amend Judgment on October 28,1993 pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Trial Court denied the Appellant's Motion for new trial in an order dated
January 7, 1994.
The notice of appeal was timely filed on January 27, 1994.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in awarding the Appellee the

amount of $1000.00 per month as permanent alimony when the marriage was one
year in duration and both parties were substantially restored to their prior financial
status.
B.

The facts and circumstances presented to the Trial Court do not support

the award of $1000.00 per month alimony in that neither the Appellee's financial
need was established nor any evidence to support the parties' standard of living
during the marriage and Appellee's financial circumstances do not warrant the
amount awarded.
C.

The Trial Court erred in the entry of its findings and conclusions in that

they do not support the material issues which govern the determination of spousal
support, i. e., financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, ability of the
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for herself and the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.
D.

The Trial Court erred in determining that the purported promise of the

Appellant to induce the reluctant Appellee into the marriage where the Appellant
would take care of the Appellee and that she would not have to worry financially was
a factor which warrants an award of alimony.
E.

The Trial Court erred in ruling that the Appellant's promise which

induced the Appellee to allegedly give up financial security is enforceable and therefor
warrants a permanent alimony award even though the marriage was of very short
duration.
F.

The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to

Appellee without a showing of 1) the Appellee's need for assistance in all or part of
the attorney's fees incurred, 2) sufficient difficulty of the litigation, 3) the necessity
and reasonableness of time expended by Appellee's attorney and para-legal staff, 4)
the reasonableness given the usual hourly rate in the community, and, 5) the
reasonableness of the fee based on the result obtained.
G.

The Trial court erred in assessing Appellee's attorney's fees to the

Appellant because of the purported unreasonable approach Appellant took to the
2

resolution of the case by not considering that Appellant prevailed on the major issue
concerning the division of property Appellant asserted in the trial.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes may be determinative concerning the issues being addressed
by this appeal:

Utah Code Sections 25-5-4, 30-3-3, and 30-3-5.

Copies of the

aforesaid sections are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A".
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in this appeal as to the issues presented on appeal is
whether the Trial Court abused its discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841
(Utah App. 1992), Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App.
1993), Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990), Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1384
(Utah 1980).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Kirk filed his Complaint for Divorce on April 2, 1992, Case No.
924901709DA.

(R.O.A. 2-4)

Ms. Kirk filed her Complaint for Divorce shortly

thereafter, Case No. 924901796DA. All references to the record contained herein are
to the Case No. filed by Mr. Kirk unless otherwise noted.
At a hearing on May 12,1992, Mr. Kirk was granted the exclusive occupancy
of his pre-marital residence located 3518 South 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and
Ms. Kirk was ordered to find other living accommodations after June 1, 1992. Ms.
Kirk was awarded $1,000.00 per month as temporary alimony during the pendency
of this action. (R.O.A. 7-9, Case No. 924901796DA filed by Ms. Kirk)
A Motion and Stipulation to consolidate Ms. Kirk's case within Mr. Kirk's case
dated July 22, 1992 was filed the same date. (R.O.A. 6) An Order granting the
Motion to consolidate was entered on July 23, 1992. (R.O.A. 7)
Subsequently, discovery was pursued and obtained by both parties, including
Request for Production of Documents, Interrogatories, and Depositions.
Mr. Kirk filed his certificate of Readiness of Trial on October 8,1992. (R.O.A.
12)
Ms. Kirk filed an Answer and Counterclaim on March 3,1993. (R.O A. 37-39)
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Trial proceedings were conducted on March 4, 9, and 23, 1993 before the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, who took the matter under advisement at the
conclusion thereof.
Judge Hanson issued his Memorandum Decision on May 4, 1993 which was
entered on the same date. A copy of said Memorandum is attached hereto and
incorporated herein as Exhibit "B".
On October 18, 1993, Mr. Kirk filed a Motion for New Trial or in the
alternative to Alter or Amend Judgment (R.O.A. 112-113) along with a Memorandum
in support thereof. (R.O.A. 106-111)
On November 19, 1993, the time for Ms. Kirk to respond having expired and
not having filed any response, Mr. Kirkfileda Notice to Submit the aforesaid Motion
for Decision. (R.O.A. 114-115)
On November 23, 1993, Ms. Kirk filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Mr.
Kirk's Motion for New Trial. (R.O.A. 122-127)
Subsequently, Mr. Kirk filed a Motion to Strike Ms. Kirk's Memorandum as
being untimely (R.O. A. 128-129) and Ms. Kirk filed a Reply thereto. (R.O.A. ISOIS 1). A ruling denying Mr. Kirk's Motion to Strike was entered shortly thereafter
(R.O.A. 132) and an Order thereon signed and entered on January 7, 1994. (R.O.A.
161)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and entered on October
18, 1993 (R.O.A. 136-155) and a Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on the
same date. (R.O.A. 156-160) A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "C". A copy of the Decree of
Divorce is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "D".
Mr. Kirk filed his Notice of Appeal on January 27,1994 (R.O.A. 162-163) and
Ms. Kirk filed her Notice of Cross Appeal on February 9,1994. (R.O.A. 186-187)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Overall Facts of the Case
Both parties had been married prior to the parties' marriage. Mr. Kirk had
been previously married in 1948, which marriage lasted for more than forty-two
years. (Transcript from the trial proceedings held on March 4, 1993 [hereinafter,
4

TV1]:17 L10-11) They had two children as issue of the marriage, both of whom have
reached the age of majority. Mr. Kirk's wife from the previous marriage, Marjorie
Kirk, died on September 12, 1990. (TV1:18 L2-20)
Peggy Kirk, Defendant/Appellee herein, had been previously married on five
occasions. She has three children, one child as a result of her prior marriage to Wally
Suberry and two children as the result of a marriage to Garth Campbell. All of her
children have been emancipated. Her last marriage of eight years, to a Mr. Bob
Taylor, ended in divorce in 1984. (TV1:16 L20-24) As a result of said divorce Ms.
Kirk was entitled to Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per week permanent alimony
prior to the marriage of the parties herein, until she should die, remarry, cohabitate,
or in the event of the death of Mr. Taylor. (Transcript from trial proceedings held
March 9, 1993 [hereinafter, TV2]:116 L25, 117 Ll-22) (Defendant's Exhibit 28)
Prior to the parties' marriage, Mr. Kirk had two years of college and was
employed in the U.S. Navy for several years, and then performed carpentry and
construction work for several years. (TV1:19 Ll-11) Beginning in 1969, Mr. Kirk
then commenced working in various positions for the Boise Cascade Company.
(TV1.19 L13-21) After working twenty (20) years for said company, he retired in
1989 as the purchasing manager. (TV1:20 L6-18) All of Mr. Kirk's retirement
benefits were earned prior to the parties' marriage. (TV1:21 L4-19)
Mr. Kirk's former wife, Marjorie, worked for the telephone company during
their marriage for twenty-five (25) years and retired therefrom in about 1989.
(TV1:21 L20-25,22 Ll-3) Mr. Kirk inherited Marjorie's retirement benefits when she
died on September 12, 1990 (TV1:18 L17-20), prior to the marriage of the parties
herein. (TV1:22 L4-18)
Ms. Peggy Kirk, appellee herein, was self-employed in a beauty shop while she
was raising her children. She then became a director of a health club in Phoenix,
Arizona. She worked as a real estate agent from 1984 to 1986 and since 1986 to the
present, has been employed as a licensed security and insurance sales person.
The parties were married on June 1, 1991. (TV1:16 L18-22) The idea of
becoming married was pursued mutually by both parties (TV1:26 L16-20,154 L12-19)
Mr. Kirk was 66 years old at the time of the marriage and 67 years old at the time
of the divorce. (TV1:16 L14-17) Ms. Kirk was 65 years old at the time of the
marriage and 66 years old at the time of the divorce. (TV2:116 L6-14) No children
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were born as issue of the marriage. The parties separated from each other less than
a year after becoming married.
Prior to their marriage, the parties discussed their respective financial
situations with each other. (TV1:26 L21 to 28 L18) Ms. Kirk was fully aware that
the alimony she was receiving from her former spouse would cease upon the parties'
marriage. (TV1:28 L19-25, 29 Ll-22)
Though Mr. Kirk was aware that Ms. Kirk would lose her entitlement to
alimony from her former spouse upon their marriage, he did not assure her prior to
the marriage that he would make up the difference after their marriage (TV1:159 L24
to 160 L3, TV2:3 L24 to 4 L8) nor that he would replace the difference in the event
of divorce. (TV2:36 L18-20)
Prior to the marriage, Mr. Kirk assisted Ms. Kirk in qualifying to receive
$496.00 per month in Social Security. (TV2:42 L5-10, 119 L18-22, 132 L7-11)
In anticipation of the marriage and seeking to commence the marriage
relationship on a good foundation, Mr. Kirk paid the following medical bills and
creditors in Ms. Kirk's behalf at her request, or with the mutual understanding of
both parties:
1. January 17, 1991
2. February 28, 1991
3. March 18, 1991
4.
Total:

Liposuction
Chase Visa
Cottonwood Ctr.
Wedding ring

$2,700.00
3,200.00
1,065.00
5,844.00
$12,890.00

Approximately two weeks following the parties' marriage, at Ms. Kirk's urging
they created a trust. (TV1:30 L5-25, 31 Ll-11) (PlaintifFs Exhibit 1) Ms. Kirk
refused to consult with counsel regarding the creation of the trust available at no
charge through the credit union at which they both had accounts. Instead, Ms. Kirk
insisted they go through Lorin Martin, the attorney of her choice. The purpose of the
trust was to function as an estate planning device in the event of the death of either
or both of them. (TVl:35Ll-5) The provisions of the trust provided that either party
could subsequently revoke at any time and remove without the other's consent, any
asset they respectively placed in the trust. (TV1:35 L18-25) (Article Four on page
two of the trust - PlaintifFs Exhibit 1) Only three of the parties' financial accounts
were actually placed in the trust, the first two of which and the last of which, were
owned respectively by Mr. and Ms. Kirk prior to their marriage:
6

1.
2.
3.

Valley Bank & Trust, Account # 02-30-406-6-5
Franklin U. S. Government Security Funds
Interstate Bank, Checking Account #28-15407-7

Though the aforesaid individual accounts were placed in joint tenancy, they
were never added to or expended by either party added as a joint tenant. (TV2:40
L17-23, 168 L18 to 169 L23)
Mr. Kirk's pre-marital assets including property inherited from his deceased
wife, decreased in value from the marriage date to the trial date from $384,197.54 to
$355,173.90 based on the expert testimony of a Certified Public Accountant who had
previously worked for ten years as an IRS criminal investigator. (TV2:81 L8-14, 96
L16 to 97 L9) (Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, page 6)
The parties filed joint federal and state income tax returns for 1991. (TV1:92
L23 to 93 L l l ) (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7) As a result of their mutual tax liability, Mr.
Kirk paid $12,348 to the Internal Revenue Service and $4,178 to the State of Utah.
The aforesaid payments included the tax liability incurred by Ms. Kirk for $9,600.00
in alimony received from her previous husband prior to and after the parties'
marriage (TV1.183 L17 to 184 L5) as well as her liability for other income she
received. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, first page, line 11) (TV1:103 L10-21) Ms. Kirk
refused to pay any amount towards the tax liability attributable to her (TV2:42 Lll21), though she admitted her separate liability was nearly $3,000.00 (TV2:61 L7-25)
Facts Specifically Related to Issues on Appeal:

Alimony, Attorneys Fees and Costs

When the parties were married, Ms. Kirk had $5,388.37 in her checking
accounts at First Interstate Bank. (TV2:170 L16-20) (Defendant's Exhibit 32) Those
accounts increased to nearly $8,000.00 shortly before trial as reflected in the ending
balances shown as of February 21,1993. (Defendant's Exhibit 31) At the conclusion
of the trial she owed $6,505.05 for attorneys fees and costs incurred.
Ms. Kirk claimed to be receiving only $1,602.00 per month in net spendable
income (Defendant's Exhibit 24) while incurring $2,287.00 in monthly expenses
(Defendant's Exhibit 25). No documentation supporting her alleged expenses was
submitted. Though she satisfied such expense during the nine months the case
proceeded to trial, she alleged that she did not know from where the difference of
$685.00 per month came. (TV2:164 Ll-6)
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In addition, she was able to pay her counsel $4,664.92 during the nine month
proceeding below, an equivalent of $517.21 per month. (Defendant's Exhibit 34) She
somehow met the $685 and paid the $517.21 averaging more than $1,200 per month
without disclosing how she did so. She borrowed no funds to pay for either the
$685.00 shortfall she alleged, nor the average of $517.21 per month for counsel fees.
None of Ms. Kirk's funds were ever co-mingled with Mr. Kirk's only checking
account held at Valley Bank nor did Ms. Kirk ever become involved in managing said
account. (TV1:74 L7-25, 75 Ll-9) Ms. Kirk also continued after the marriage to
maintain and manage separate from Mr. Kirk, her bank accounts held at First
Security Bank. (TV1:77 L8 to 79 L17) Ms. Kirk continued after the marriage to
manage her financial affairs separate from Mr. Kirk. (TV1:81 L18-25, 82 Ll-6)
During the marriage, each maintained their separate bank accounts, depositing
and spending their individual income as they did prior to the date of marriage.
(TV1:82 L21 to 83 L8, 185 L23 to 186 L10, 195 L l l to 196 L3, TV2:11 L6-11, 33 L8
to 34 L4, 35 Ll-22, 39 L12-25, 40 L24 to 41 L22, 82 L10 to 84 L5, 95 L2 to 96 L14,
178 L22 to 179 L12, 184 L20 to 185 L16)
During the first six months that the parties cohabited after marriage, they
resided in Ms. Kirk's rental apartment while Mr. Kirk's pre-marital home was in the
process of re-construction. (TV1:82 L7-16,134 L21 to 135 L6,186 L12-21) Following
completion of the re-construction, they parties resided in Mr. Kirk's pre-marital
residence during the last six months prior to their separation on May 31, 1992.
(TV1:82 L17-20)
Mr. Kirk's income is all derived from pre-marital assets consisting of interest,
dividends and pension from his retirement funds and his deceased wife' retirement
funds. Essentially, his annual income is:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Social Security
Dividends
Interest
His retirement and former
deceased wife's retirement

$10,186.00
11,307.00
7,206.00
14,212.00
$42,911.00
$3,575.92

Monthly:

8

Mr. Kirk's monthly expenses total $2,319.81.

(TV1:85 L7 to 90 L18)

(Plaintiffs Exhibit 3)
During the course of the underlying proceedings, Mr. Kirk was ordered to pay
$1,000.00 per month as temporary alimony to Ms. Kirk. (R.O.A. 7-9, Case No.
924901796DA filed by Ms. Kirk) The payment of said alimony was derived from Mr.
Kirk's pre-marital funds. (TV1:101 L21 to 103 L21) Mr. Kirk's only checking account
maintained at Valley Bank decreased from $24,952.00 at the time of the marriage to
a minus $824.00 due to the payments of temporary alimony to Ms. Kirk and to meet
their mutual income tax obligations. (TV1:107 L16 to 108 L15, 137 L9-10, L15-25)
Ms. Kirk's financial income was substantially unaffected by the marriage.
(TV1:104 L22 to 106 LI)
Ms. Kirk maintained her employment nearly full time at Financial Services as
a licensed security and insurance agent throughout the marriage as she had done for
nearly a decade prior thereto. (TV1:194 L18-25, TV2:117 L23 to 118 L4)
At the conclusion of the trial Ms. Kirk's counsel made a proffer concerning her
attorneys fees and costs. The Trial Court accepted the proffer on the condition that
in doing so it acknowledged that Mr. Kirk disputed Ms. Kirk's need for such fees and
costs and that he did not admit to the reasonableness of the same. (TV2:208 L4 to
210 L l l ) (Defendant's Exhibit 34)
Other than the mere proffer, no evidence was introduced addressing the
reasonableness of Ms. Kirk's attorneys fees and costs. Nothing else was submitted
to support fee reasonableness based on either 1) the difficulty of the litigation, 2) the
necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 3) the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, nor 4) the result obtained.
The issues decided by the Trial Court concerned the division of property,
alimony, and attorney' fees. The issue concerning the division of property, consumed
by far the majority of the pre-trial discovery, trial preparation, and the trial
proceedings including testimony and exhibits, upon which issue Mr. Kirk prevailed.
The Trial Court awarded Ms. Kirk $1,000 per month permanent alimony,
$6,505 in attorney fees, and $592.47 in costs.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Kirk is not entitled to alimony based on the rationale stated by the Trial
Court.
The Trial Court erred in awarding alimony where the evidence is insufficient
to show neither Ms. Kirk's need for alimony, her inability to support herself, nor Mr.
Kirk's ability to pay. The evidence instead shows, that she has no need given her
financial condition, that she is able to support herself, and Mr. Kirk's disability to
pay.
The Trial Court further erred in basing alimony on 1) an invalid replacement
theory, 2) a disputed oral promise, which basis is contrary to the Statute of Frauds,
3) standard of living, though the evidence shows the parties never established nor
experienced a combined standard of living, and 4) inadequate consideration of the
length of the marriage (one year) in unfairly granting Ms. Kirk the effect of a lifetime annuity of $1,000.00 per month as alimony.
The alimony award effectively replaced Ms. Kirk's lost alimony. Ms. Kirk is
not entitled to have Mr. Kirk replace her prior alimony of approximately $800.00 per
month from a prior eight year marriage. She is not so entitled on two grounds:
First, because her prior alimony is irrelevant under Utah case law and because
such replacement operates to improperly impose a penalty upon Mr. Kirk and
improperly reward Ms. Kirk. Ms. Kirk entered the marriage knowing full well her
alimony would be terminated and therefore, she should bear the responsibility for her
loss of alimony. Second, basing the alimony award upon Mr. Kirk's purported and
disputed oral promise of financially taking care of Ms. Kirk upon their marriage is
contrary to and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Thus, the Trial Court
should not have imposed a $1,000.00 per month award of permanent alimony upon
Mr. Kirk on the grounds that Ms. Kirk lost her prior alimony by virtue of the subject
marriage.
The necessary evidence for an alimony award - evidence showing the parties
experience a combined standard of living, was not established due to the fact that
each party kept and maintained their separate accounts.
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Ms. Kirk is not entitled to the $1000 per month permanent alimony award
when giving the necessary consideration to the brevity of the parties' marriage: less
than one year. Though the Trial Court acknowledged its brevity, the Court did not
take into adequate consideration its very short duration.
Each party should bear his or her own attorney's fees.
The Trial Court has discretion in awarding attorney's fees to either party.
Nevertheless, in doing so, the Court should consider, a) the need or ability of either
party to pay attorney's fees, and b) the reasonableness of the fee based on 1) the
diflBculty of the litigation, 2) the necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours
spent on the case, 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services,
and particularly, 4) the result obtained - which party prevailed on the majority of the
issues.
The findings on attorney fees and costs recite no supporting facts and are
merely conclusory. The Trial Court made no actual findings of fact on any of the
foregoing factors. Rather, they merely conclude that the fees are reasonable. The
findings are thus deficient on their face. The findings concerning reasonableness,
actually being conclusory only, were based solely on Ms. Kirk's counsel's proffer which
was insufficient to prove reasonableness.
Need and ability
While Mr. Kirk's ability exceeds Ms. Kirk's ability, Ms. Kirk has the ability to
fully pay her own attorney fees.

Ms. Kirk's life style was not altered to any

significant degree and her ability to pay her attorney's fees was unaffected by the
marriage and its termination.

She retains roughly $60,000.00 equity in an

$80,000.00 condominium, and was able to meet all her expenses plus pay her counsel
an average of $517 per month during the nine month proceeding below. Ms. Kirk did
not show that she had the requisite need for an award of attorney fees. Rather, the
evidence shows she has the assets and income to pay her own fees.
Reasonableness based on the four above factors
The evidence does not support that the attorneys fees she incurred were
reasonable, given the absence of difficulty in the litigation, the lack of necessity and
unreasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
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charged for similar services, and especially given the result she obtained for having
incurred her fees,
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS ALIMONY
AWARD AND ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DETERMINING THE
BASIS THEREOF,
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING MS. KIRKS
NEED. HER ABILITY TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT INCOME
FOR HERSELF. AND MR. KIRK'S ABILITY TO PAY,

There are three factors, among others which may be applicable such as those
argued above, which must be considered by the trial court in assessing the propriety
of an alimony award. Those three factors, which have been set forth in a number of
Utah decisions, are as follows:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the spouse requesting alimony;
[2] the ability of the requesting spouse to produce sufficient income for that
spouse's needs; and
[3] the ability of the responding spouse to provide support.
(See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 R2d 84 (Ut. App, 1989), Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d
669,671 (Ut. App. 1987) Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah
1977))
In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Ut. App. 1991), this Court stated,
We emphasize one again that, in considering these factors, the
trial court must make adequate factual findings on all material issues
unless the facts in the record are "clear, ^incontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." (citing Houmont,
793 R2d at 424.)
(See also Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Ut. App. 1988)
Also, in Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987):
This court concurs in the supreme Court's reflection that more
detailed findings on each required factor would assist in the appellate
process.
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In Bell v. Bell9 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Ut. App. 1991) this Court noted:
[T]he trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact
on each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's
discretionary determination was rationally based upon these three
factors, (citations omitted) If sufficient findings are not made, we must
reverse....
This Court has further noted in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 R2d 1331,1334 (Ut.
App. 1988):
The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion
on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah 1979).
Recently, in Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 546-7 (Ut. App. 1993), this Court
went further and noted that the Trial Court must do more that simply restate the
requesting spouse's testimony concerning monthly expenses: "This finding is plainly
insufficient because it fails to adequately address [the requesting spouse's] financial
condition and needs." This Court explained that simply restating the requesting
spouse's testimony regarding expenses does not justify their reasonableness nor
explain how the court arrived at a certain sum as an appropriate amount of alimony.
Both in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841843 (Ut. App. 1992) and Canning
v. Canning, 744 R2d 325, 326 (Ut. App. 1987) this Court stated that findings
concerning the requesting spouse must include that spouse's level of education,
health, and other matters concerning the spouse's immediate or eventual
employability.
This court has also noted in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1170 (Ut. App. 1990)
that "alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is disparity between
the parties' incomes."
The Trial Court's findings do not pass the muster of the above stated
requirements and that the facts are sufficiently controverted to question the findings.
Ms. Kirk's financial condition and needs.
Other than a few personal property items which she disposed of upon the
parties' marriage, all of Ms. Kirk's premarital assets were restored to her by award
of the Trial Court. She still owns and controls her condominium in Arizona in which
she has nearly $60,000 in equity. She was awarded all her premarital household
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furniture and fixtures which had not be disposed of upon the parties' marriage. She
retains her 1983 Lincoln Continental Mark VI automobile and both her checking
accounts held at First Interstate Bank.
At the time the parties married, the beginning balance of Ms. Kirk's checking
accounts at First Interstate Bank was $5,388.37. (TV2:170 L16-20) (Defendant's
Exhibit 32) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 32 is attached hereto and incorporated as
Exhibit "E". Ms. Kirk testified that those accounts increased to $7,976.88 at the time
of trial. (See ending balances shown as of February 21, 1993 in Defendant's Exhibit
31) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 31 is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit
"F". Thus, her bank balance increased by $2,588.51.
Ms. Kirk further testified that her medical insurance coverage will increase
from what it had been in the past. (TV2.197 L14 to 198 L9) When asked on cross
examination, "So is it more extended coverage, or less in coverage than you had
before you got married?", she replied, "It would be more...It's FHP is what it is."
When asked if "It's a more extended coverage now than you had before the
marriage?", she replied, "I have major medical." (TV2:198 L2-9)
Ms. Kirk's restoration to her premarital financial condition including her
condominium equity and the evidence showing a substantial increase in her bank
account, does not demonstrate that she has a need for a $1,000 per month permanent
alimony award.
Ms. Kirk's ability to produce sufficient income for herself.
The findings do not address Ms. Kirk's level of education and her health
condition, factors required under Chambers concerning Ms. Kirk's employability.
Ms. Kirk has been licensed in securities and insurance and worked in that field
for nearly a decade. (TV2:117 L23 to 118 L4) (TV2:187 L7-15) She testified that she
worked nearly full time during the marriage, has flexible hours, and can work as
many hours as she wants. (TV2.190 L7 to 192 L4) On cross examination she was
asked, "Before the marriage you were working eight hours a day?", to which she
answered, "Roughly." (TV2:192 L17-19)
Ms. Kirk is also receiving $496.00 per month in Social Security benefits which
she was not receiving at the time of her prior divorce. (TV2:119 L18-22) It was Mr.
Kirk who assisted Ms. Kirk in obtaining the aforesaid Social Security benefit. (TV2:
L7-11)

Even considering the $860.00 per month in prior alimony, lost by the

14

marriage, Ms. Kirk's $496.00 Social Security results in a difference of only $364.00
per month.
Ms. Kirk listed her purported expenses on Defendant's Exhibit 25.

Said

Exhibit was admitted as illustrative only of her testimony. (TV2:125 Ll-5) A copy
of Defendant's Exhibit 25 is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "G". An
inspection of Exhibit 25 alleging her expenses reveals figures which are at best rough
estimates which have been rounded off to suit its purpose of supporting a high total.
When asked regarding the preciseness of her Exhibit 25 figures she responded that
her expenses vary, "but it's roughly that, but I can't tell you the dates that I buy
things." (TV2:193 L3-7) None of the figures listed on her Statement of Monthly
Expenses were supported by any documentation whatsoever.
Ms. Kirk claimed to have only $1,602 "net expendable monthly income with
alimony at $1,000 per month" (TV2:119 L13 to 123 L7) (Defendant's Exhibit 24) and
have $2,287 in "total monthly expenses". (TV2:123 L8 to 125 L5) (Defendant's
Exhibit 25) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 24, admitted soley as illustrative of her
testimony (TV2:211 L20-25), is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "H". Yet
while meeting the $685 difference between her net income and expenses during the
course of the proceedings, she also paid her counsel $4,664.92, an average of $517.21
per month.

(Total of retainer and payments listed on Defendant's Exhibit 34:

$1,000.00 + $262.65 + $233.77 + $1,190.05 + $56.25 + $412.65 + $396.70 + $987.85
+ $125.00) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 34 is attached hereto and incorporated as
Exhibit "I". She also increased her checking account balance $2,588.51 as shown in
the above section addressing her need.
When asked how she could possibly be meeting the $685 difference between the
$2,287 in expenses she claimed and her $1,602 in expendable income (TV2:162 L l l
to 167 L6) she attempted to claim having to make withdrawals from her checking
account balance. (TV2:166 L3 to 167 L6) Nevertheless, when asked directly, ffWhere
does the extra $600.00 comefrom?",her response was equally direct: "These are the
figures. I don't know." (TV2:164 L5-6) Though being licensed and actively employed
for nearly a decade in selling securities and insurance, she claimed she didn't know
how she was meeting the $685 per month shortfall in expenses she alleged. As noted
above, her bank balances increased nearly $3,000.00 while she met all her alleged
expenses. She was obviously not drawing on her bank balance to meet her expenses.
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Ms. Kirk never claimed to have borrowed funds to meet the purported $685
difference nor to have borrowed funds to pay her counsel.

It would have been

impossible for her to have paid her counsel $517.21 per month and meet the $685.00
per month shortfall while only having the income she claimed, unless she seriously
inflated her actual expenses and/or under reported her income. The $685.00 in
expenses she met and the $517.21 paid to her counsel, equals $1,202.21 in monthly
payments she made from income that is unaccounted for from her income as claimed.
Based thereon, Ms. Kirk must actually be receiving over $1,200.00 per month from
sources which were not disclosed to Mr. Kirk or the Court. For her income to be
otherwise, her actual monthly expenses must be approximately $1,200 less than she
claimed. She cannot have it both ways.
The $1,000.00 per month alimony award is obviously a windfall for Ms. Kirk.
The $2,600.00 bank account increase plus the $4,600.00 paid in fees equals $7,200.00,
an average of $800.00 per month income during the nine month proceeding in excess
of her claimed expenses. At most, a $200.00 per month award would meet her
alleged, though unsubstantiated need.
The trial court failed to consider the fact that Ms. Kirk not only met all her
expenses during the course of the nine month proceeding below, but had the ability
to pay her counsel $517.21 per month during the same period. The Trial Court failed
to realize that Ms. Kirk must have had either a) at least an additional $1,200 per
month in undisclosed income to enable her to meet her expenses and pay such
counsel fees, or b) that her unsubstantiated claim of expenses is inflated
approximately $1,200 above actuality, or c) a combination of the foregoing two
aspects.

The aforesaid $1,200 per month discrepancy shows that Ms. Kirk is

financially able to provide for herself without any assistance from Mr. Kirk, let alone
a permanent $1,000 per month award. Had the Trial Court considered the above
facts, it would not have awarded Ms. Kirk any alimony.
Mr. Kirk's ability to pay.
Mr. Kirk received no earned income while the parties courted each other nor
during the marriage. His sole source of income is derived from Social Security along
with investment and retirement income earned by him and his deceased wife prior
to the marriage. Approximately one-third of his income is derived from sources
inherited from his deceased wife. These sources include stock or other accounts held
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with AT&T, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell South NYNEX, Pactel Southwest Bell and
US West as shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 9 noted by "I PM" representing Inherited
Pre-Marital property.
The alimony award is thus tantamount to an ongoing distribution of Mr. Kirk's
premarital estate.

The award is equivalent in value to taking the benefits

accumulated over a lifetime by Mr. Kirk's deceased wife and giving the interest and
dividends being paid on those benefits to Ms. Kirk for the remainder of her life.
Whereas Mr. Kirk and his deceased wife planned that Mr. Kirk would be the
recipient of his deceased wife's benefits, the ongoing payout thereon has now been
effectively transferred to Ms. Kirk by her replacing Mr. Kirk's deceased wife during
a short one year relationship.
Summary on Ms. Kirk's need, her ability to support herself, and
Mr. Kirk's ability to pay.
The facts show that Ms. Kirk has no need of alimony. She has the ability to
support herself from the $1,200 per month along with her $256 in earned income and
the $496 in Social Security per month. Those figures total $1,952 per month. Her
$2,287 in claimed, though unsubstantiated expenses, less $1,952 leaves

$335.

Certainly the $335 gap is also met considering the $2,588.51 increase in her bank
balance.
Alimony cannot be awarded in excess of Ms. Kirk's need, regardless of Mr.
Kirk's ability to pay. Recently in Bingham v. Bingham, 236 Utah Adv. Rep 29,31 (Ut.
App. 1994), this Court stated,
[T]he trial court apparently awarded plaintiff $701.76 per month
more than her projected financial requirements. * * * [W]e agree with
defendant that the court should not have awarded plaintiff more than
her established needs required, regardless of defendant's ability to pay
this excess amount. * * * [T]he spouse's demonstrated need must, under
Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony award.
Since the facts in this case demonstrate that Ms. Kirk has no need, no alimony
is permissible.

Yet the Trial court found, "defendant is in need of alimony."

(Paragraph 37) The Court's findings that Ms. Kirk receives only $690 income per
month (Paragraph 38) and that she has $2,287 per month in reasonable expenses
(Paragraph 39), are clearly erroneous.
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Since the findings are clearly erroneous where the facts show Ms. Kirk's own
ability to meet all her claimed need, the alimony award should be reversed and
vacated in its entirety. In the alternative, the alimony award should be reversed and
remanded for the following reasons:
The evidence on the three factors of 1) Ms. Kirk's financial condition and need,
2) her ability to support herself, and 3) Mr. Kirk's ability to pay, do not support the
alimony award.
The findings on the three factors enunciated in Schindler, Boyle, Paffel, Jones,
and English, are not adequate on all the material issues as required by Rudman and
Bell. Also, the findings are not detailed enough as required in Boyle. The findings
do not disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached as required inRasband.

The findings concerning Ms. Kirk's needs obviously

fail to meet the sufficiency of Baker in that the findings simply restate her testimony
concerning her monthly expenses. As noted in Baker a simple restatement of Ms.
Kirk's testimony regarding her expenses does not justify their reasonableness.
The findings provide that Ms. Kirk's need to which she testified, is based both
on the standard of living during the marriage and Ms. Kirk's standard of living prior
to the marriage. (Paragraph 39) Yet, the Trial Court made no findings based on any
certain dollar figures whatsoever, on either the purported standard of living during
the marriage nor Ms. Kirk's premarital standard of living. This is not surprising
since the parties experienced no combined standard of living during the marriage,
keeping all their expenses strictly separate during their relationship. Further, there
is insufficient evidence to support what Ms. Kirk's premarital standard of living may
have been.

The Trial Court's finding of Ms. Kirk's need based solely on her

unsupported testimony of her expenses is inadequate and does not justify their
reasonableness.
The trial court did not explain how it arrived at the certain sum of $1,000 per
month as an appropriate alimony award as required by Baker.
The findings do not address Ms. Kirk's level of education, though she is
obviously well educated having a license in securities and insurance for nearly a
decade. The findings do not address Ms. Kirk's health situation, though she appears
to be in good health and there was no testimony supporting that she was ailing in
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any way mentally or physically. The lack of findings on these two issues are contrary
to both Chambers and Canning.
The trial court based its finding of reasonableness concerning her need and
ability to support herself on her unsubstantiated and questionable testimony of both
her claimed expenses and income. The evidence seriously contradicts the findings
concerning Ms. Kirk's employability. The testimony supports that she is actively
employed, working nearly full time, capable of full time employment and that
nothing, including her age and health, prevents her from being actively employed on
a full time basis.

The Trial Court's findings to the contrary are obviously

controverted and incapable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment as
required by Throckmorton.
It seems the Trial court made the alimony award automatically based an what
appeared to be a disparity in the parties' income. Such a basis is contrary to Burt.
Ms. Kirk's financial condition shows that she was substantially restored to her
premarital status. The increase in her bank balance of $2,600 to nearly $8,000 at the
time of trial belie her need. She was able to meet both, a) the $685 per month
difference between her stated income and expenses, and b) pay an average of $517.21
per month toward her attorney fees during the nine month trial proceeding. The
aforesaid bank balance increase, along with the discrepancy of more that $1,200 per
month during the nine month proceeding, provides sufficient evidence of her ability
to support herself.
Mr. Kirk's only ability to provide support is based on a distribution of earnings
from premarital assets, including those assets inherited from his deceased wife. The
alimony award is thus tantamount to an ongoing inappropriate distribution of his
premarital assets. It is unjustly equivalent to awarding Ms. Kirk the income derived
from Mr. Kirk's deceased wife's accumulation of benefits acquired by forty years work.
Given the insufficiency of the findings, the $1,200 discrepancy, and her bank
balance increase, this court should reverse the alimony award and remand with
directions to enter findings as required on the factors in which the findings are silent.
If remanded, the Trial Court should also be directed to address the $1,200 discrepancy
during the nine month trial proceeding, and the $2,588.51 increase in her bank
balance.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS ALIMONY
AWARD TO MS. KIRK ON THE FOLLOWING:
1.

THE INVALID THEORY THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO
HAVE HER PRIOR ALIMONY OF $860.00 PER MONTH
FROM A PRIOR EIGHT YEAR MARRIAGE REPLACED
BY MR. KIRK

In its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court stated, "At the time of the instant
marriage the defendant was divorced from her prior husband and was receiving
permanent alimony in the sum of $200 per week, or $860 per month." (Findings of
Fact, Para. 5, at bottom of p. 2) The Trial Court further found that Ms. Kirk asserted
"that she is entitled to substantial alimony...in view of what she gave up in the form
of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff.... (Findings of Fact, Para.
9) Last, "The Court is satisfied that she would not have entered into the marital
relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff that she would be reasonably
financially secure should she agree to give up her sources of income in the form of
permanent alimonyfroma prior spouse and enter into the marital relationship with
the plaintiff. (Findings of Fact, Paragraph 37)
Nevertheless, Houmont v. Houmont, 793 P.2d 421 (Ut. App. 1990) supports the
proposition that the Trial court cannot impose an alimony award to the spouse simply
on the grounds that the spouse lost alimony by virtue of the subject marriage. In
Houmont, this Court reversed the Trial Court's award of alimony where the main
justification for awarding alimony was the fact that the spouse lost alimony by
remarriage. Houmont concerned a three and one-half year marriage with no children
issuing therefrom.
In the Houmont case, Ms. Houmont had been receiving permanent alimony of
$510 per monthfroma previous husband prior to marrying Mr. Houmont. As in the
instant case, Mr. Houmont was ordered to pay $1000 per month in temporary
alimony commencing shortly after the parties' separation and at the conclusion of
trial the Trial Court "found that each party had premarital property and awarded
each party his or her own property." Houmont, at 423. Mr. Houmont was also
ordered to pay $510 per month in permanent alimony. (Id.)
On appeal, Mr. Houmont argued that "the trial judge awarded alimony to her
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[Ms. Houmont] on the impermissible grounds that appellee had lost $510 per month
permanent alimony when she married appellant and, thus, improperly shifted
appellee's former husband's obligation to appellant." (Id.)
The Houmont Trial Court found that "as a result of said marriage, the
Defendant lost alimony in the sum of $510 per month," and that "alimony should be
granted in favor of Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the sum of $510 per month.
(Houmont, at 424)
Absent the requisite findings upon which this court reiterated in Houmont that
alimony should be based, it reversed the alimony award based on a replacement
theory and remanded for entry of such findings.
More recently in Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 75-77 (Ut. App. 1991) this
Court ruled that fact of wife losing $1100 per month in alimony by virtue of her
marriage was an insufficient basis for award of alimony, her lost alimony being
irrelevant, and reversed the alimony award as a matter of law:
Both parties had previously been married and divorced. At the
time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had been receiving $1,100 per
month in permanent alimony from her former husband.
Mrs. Rudman's alimony from her former marriage terminated
upon her marriage to Mr. Rudman.
The findings regarding alimony state that Mrs. Rudman lost
$1,100 per month in alimony by virtue of her marriage to Mr. rudman
and that it was therefore, "reasonable and just" that temporary alimony
of $1,100 per month be paid to her until she reaches age sixty-five, at
which age she would begin to receive social security benefits.
This is error in that the amount of alimony lost upon remarriage
is irrelevant....
Because the court erred as a matter of law, we reverse the
alimony award and remand for adequate findings on the requisite
factors.
As was correctly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gramme v. Gramme,
587 R2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979):
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital support; it is
intended neither as a penalty to be imposed on the husband nor as a
reward granted to the wife.
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(See also, Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 326 (Ut. App. 1987), Turner v.
Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8-9 (Utah 1982), and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,411 (Utah,
1977) regarding the impropriety of imposing alimony as a penalty or reward.)
Ms. Kirk's loss of prior alimony by her marriage to Mr. Kirk is no different
than the loss experienced by young people who marry, move from their parent's
home, and give up their parent's financial support. Mr. Kirk should not have the
obligation of replacing the lost alimony any more than the financial support
previously received from parents should be replaced.
The only fair and reasonable conclusion that can be reached after a review of
the Trial Court's actions in connection with its award of alimony vis-a-vis the
evidence which was presented to it, was that the Trial Court thought that some sort
of penalty was appropriate because Mr. Kirk had filed for divorce.
In essence, what the Trial Court did was penalize Mr. Kirk and reward Ms.
Kirk by unfairly replacing the alimony obligation of Ms. Kirk's former husband
created by virtue of an eight year marriage. Such a result is patently unfair and not
in accord with the cases cited above on the issue of alimony. Aflfirming the Trial
Court's replacement theory would be contrary to established precedent.
Ms. Kirk's lost alimony is not a basis upon which alimony may be imposed.
This Court should vacate the alimony award insofar as it was entered on the basis
that Ms. Kirk was entitled to have her lost alimony replaced by Mr. Kirk.
2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO MS. KIRK
BASED ON MR. KIRK'S PURPORTED PRE-MARITAL PROMISE
THAT HE WOULD FINANCIALLY TAKE CARE OF MS. KIRK FOR
THE LOSS OF HER ALIMONY FROM A PRIOR EIGHT YEAR
MARRIAGE. SPECIFICALLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT
SUCH A BASIS FOR THE ALIMONY AWARD IS CONTRARY TO THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, WHERE THE PARTIES NEVER REDUCED
TO WRITING NOR SIGNED ANY INSTRUMENT BASED ON SUCH
PURPORTED PROMISE.
The Trial Court's findings state: "At the time of the instant marriage the
defendant was divorced from her prior husband and was receiving permanent
alimony in the sum of $200 a week, or $860 per month." (Findings of Fact, Para. 2
at the bottom of page 2)
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The findings further state: "The evidence is clear and the Court finds that
when confronted with the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the reasons stated
above [concerning her financial status; i.e., loss of prior awarded alimony] that
plaintiff promised the defendant that she would not need to worry financially, that
he would take care of her in a financial setting." (Id., middle of page 3) The findings
also state: "[T]he defendant ultimately was satisfied based upon the plaintiffs [oral]
representations that marriage at her stage in life under the circumstances then
existing would not effect her financial stability even though she would lose her
permanent alimony. Based on the foregoing, she agreed to marry the plaintiff." (Id.,
top of page 4)
Later, the findings note in Para. 9 that Ms. Kirk asserts, "that she is entitled
to substantial alimony based upon the promises and representations of the plaintiff
in view of what she gave up in the form of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry
the plaintiff,...."
Ms. Kirk argued that the "Kirk Family Trust" (Plaintiffs Ex. "1"), executed by
the parties a couple weeks subsequent to their marriage, should be viewed as a
pre-nuptial agreement. The Trial Court rejected her view, stating in Paragraphs 20
and 21 of the findings:
20. The establishment of the Kirk Family Trust is not and cannot be
construed as a pre-nuptial agreement which would purportedly govern
the rights of the parties should a divorce occur.
21. The Kirk Family Trust was an estate planning device and was so
contemplated by the parties.
Paragraph 37 of the findings, further provide the following:
While the Court has determined that the plaintiffs promises to
the defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert a legal claim
against the plaintiffs premarital properties, the Court is satisfied that
the plaintiffs promises which induced the defendant to give up financial
security are enforceable. The plaintiff made promises of financial
security to the defendant to induce her to enter into the marriage
relationship. The Court is satisfied that she would not have entered
into the marital relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff that
she would be reasonable financially secure should she agree to give up
her sources of income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior
spouse and enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff. The
plaintiff made a promise which he acknowledges. The promise is
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significant as far as the defendant was concerned, and the plaintiff
ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience and in equity. * *
* This Court, therefore, determines that defendant is entitled to
permanent alimony from plaintiff....
Finally, Paragraph 41 of the findings provides:
ff

[C]onsidering the promises made to the defendant by the plaintiff
and reasonable needs of the defendant, the Court is satisfied that an
ongoing alimony requirement in the sum of $1,000 per month is
necessary and reasonable, which alimony should continue until such
time as defendant should remarry, cohabit or the death of either party.
The aforesaid findings imply the evidence supports that both parties
acknowledged Mr. Kirk's purported promise to financially take care of Ms. Kirk and
that both parties' testimony is ^incontradictory with respect thereto. Nevertheless,
Mr. Kirk's responses on cross examination from opposing counsel belie this view:
Q.
Did you tell her that you were making about $4,000 a
month off of your various investments, and pension plan, social security,
and you should be able to make it without the alimony?
A.
No.
(TV1:159 L24 to 160 L3)
Q.
Mr. Kirk, when you testified on direct examination
yesterday, you testified that you showed your accountings of assets and
income to Peggie; that she had shown you tax returns, and when she
brought up the question of alimony you told her that you could make it
and get by even though the alimony would be lost; is that correct?
A.
No.
Q.
That is not correct?
A.
That's right.
(TV2:3 L24 to 4 L8)
Q.
Any discussions about alimony, or payment to her if the
divorce was obtained?
A.
No.
(TV2:36 L18-20)
In Ms. Kirk's Trial Memorandum (R.O.A. 114-124, Case No. 924901796) on
page 3, she relied on Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984) for the
theory that "oral contracts are enforceable...on the basis that the parties admitted to
such agreement". As shown by Mr. Kirk's testimony above, he disputes rather than
admits, Ms. Kirk's claim that he would take care of her financially upon their
marriage or in the event of divorce. Further, Baldwin was not a marital case, rather,
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it dealt with a dispute over real property.

Also, Baldwin noted that, "part

performance was sufficient to remove the contract from the statute of frauds under
these circumstances where the existence of the contract was admitted." Id, at 417.
No conduct of the parties herein shows any performance of the alleged oral
promise other than the marriage itself.

Marriage alone, is not recognized as

performance as is discussed below. There is no evidence that upon the marriage, Mr.
Kirk made up for Ms. Kirk's lost alimony. After the marriage, they each continued
to separately control their assets, income, and separately pay their individual
expenses. Thus, the facts in Baldwin are clearly distinguishable from the facts in
this matter.
Even if Mr. Kirk's had purportedly made the oral promise to Ms. Kirk stated
in the findings referred to above, such an agreement would be barred as
unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds. One of the oldest statutory provisions
regulating marital contracts is the Statute of Frauds. The original Statute of Frauds
was enacted by the Parliament of England in 1677 to prevent "fraudulent
practices...upheld by perjury" and other similar abuses that occurred when informal
contracts, especially oral contracts, were sought to be enforced.

(See generally,

Farnsworth, Contracts 369-73 (1982); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 51-64 (1935
Ed reprinted 1971))
Section Four of the Statue of Frauds listed five categories of contracts which
could not be enforced unless they were "in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith" or by the party's authorized agent. Included was "any agreement
made upon consideration of marriage." While the Statute of Frauds did not become
a part of the common law that was adopted in the United States, virtually all states
have enacted their own versions of the Statute requiring agreements made upon
consideration of marriage to be in writing. (See Farnsworth, supra at 371)
Similarly, the Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts, §124 (1981)
provides: "A promise for which all or part of the consideration is either marriage or
a promise to marry is within the Statute of Frauds, except in the case of an
agreement which consists only of mutual promises of two persons to marry each
other." Another section reiterates that "a contract made upon consideration of
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marriage" is unenforceable unless it is in writing or within one of the exceptions to
the Statute of Frauds. (Id. at §110(l)(c))
In Utah, the requirements of the Statute of Frauds is reflected in Utah Code
Section 25-5-4(3) titled, Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed, which
provides as follows:
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
(3)
every agreement, promise, or undertaking made
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
A copy of the aforesaid Section is included herein under Exhibit "A".
To counsel's knowledge the only marital case in Utah applying its Statute of
Frauds (§25-5-4(3)), is Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Ut. App. 1987) In Brown, a
stipulation to a divorce decree, reached between one of the parties anc ^oth counsel,
while the other party remained silent while it was discussed and read into the
deposition record, was not binding. The court ruled that for such an agreement to be
binding, it "must be evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record before a judge.
The facts in this case do not show such evidence. Therefore, there was no stipulation
reached between the parties and there is nothing for the court to enforce." Id. at 335.
Occasionally, issues have arisen in States other than Utah concerning the
validity of unwritten antenuptial contracts. These issues usually arise when there
has been alleged performance or part performance of the premarital agreement.
Nevertheless, Professor Corbin, in his Treatise, Corbin on Contracts, (1963) in Vol.
2 at §463 notes the following: "The fact that the marriage ceremony has actually
taken place, so that the consideration for the promise of a settlement is executed, is
generally held not to take the promise out of the statute or make the promise
enforceable." In the same section, Corbin notes that such is the prevailing rule
followed by the courts in America today.
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In most recent cases where one party has attempted to enforce an oral
antenuptial contract, the courts have been very strict and generally unreceptive to
the claims. The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals explained the reason for this
strict judicial scrutiny in Rossiter v. Rossiter, 666 P.2d 617, 621 (1983) where the
husband appealed from a trial court Supplemental Decree of Divorce ordering that
the parties' residence was to be sold. The husband alleged that the parties had
entered into an oral antenuptial agreement to the effect that the wife would never
force the sale of the marital residence. The Hawaii Statute of Frauds, however,
requires such antenuptial agreements to be in writing, as does Utah. Nevertheless,
the husband argued that the oral agreement should be enforced because of part
performance contending that the parties' marriage, their move to Hawaii, purchase
of the property and his efforts constructing the house constituted sufficient part
performance to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. The court rejected
that argument noting:
The doctrine of part performance 'takes the case out of the statute
not because it furnishes proof of the contract, or because it makes the
contract any stronger, but because it would be intolerable in equity for
the owner of a tract of land knowingly to suffer another to invest time,
labor, and money in that land, upon the faith of a contract which did not
exist/ 73 Am Jur 2d, Statute of Frauds §400 (1974)
Consequently,
courts require the part performance to be of a character which is
unequivocally referable to the alleged parol agreement and cannot admit
of explanation without reference to such agreement. 73 Am Jur 2d.
Statute of Frauds §§405-406 (1974). The acts constituting part
performance 'must clearly appear to have been done in pursuance of the
contract, and to result from the contract and not from some other
relation/ 30 ALR2d at 1421-1422.
The mere act of marriage is almost universally held to be
insufficient part performance and additional acts are not necessarily
sufficient either. 30 ALR2d at 1420; 73 Am Jr 2d at 136.
The evidence in the instant matter indicates not even partial performance of
Mr. Kirk's alleged promise. Throughout their brief one year marriage, both parties
kept their financial dealings separate. Mr. Kirk did not replace Ms. Kirk's lost
alimony during their marriage.
(See also, Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. App. 1983) (Oral antenuptial
agreement unenforceable after the original written antenuptial contract was torn up).
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The drafters of the Restatement, Second, Contracts, at §124, comment d,
support the application of a strict policy with respect to antenuptial agreements as
follows:
An oral contract between prospective spouses made upon
consideration of marriage does not become enforceable merely because
the marriage has take place in reliance on it, nor by virtue of
subsequent action incident to the marriage relation, since the contrary
rule would deprive the marriage provision of the Statute [of Frauds] of
any significant effect.
Even if the purported oral promise in the case was made, Mr. Kirk made it to
apply only so long as the parties remained together, and not otherwise. Typical of
oral promises ofttimes made by parties upon marriage is that of remaining married
"until death do us part". Enforcement of such oral promise would preclude either
spouse from terminating the marriage by divorce. Such preclusion would obviously
be against public policy. Enforcement of the purported oral promise in this matter
would be equally contrary to public policy.
As a matter of policy analysis, it should be obvious that there are sound
reasons for requiring specific formalities to be observed, such as written memoranda,
acknowledgment by written signature, and so on, before antenuptial agreements will
be enforced. Apart from the possibility of fraud and perjury, which exists regarding
all contracts, not just antenuptial agreements, there is the fact that parties who are
contemplating marriage and making agreements in consideration thereof are not
prone to deal with each other as ordinary prudent business people do. Their memory
of unrecorded promises will be heavily affected by their emotions.
Especially in Utah, where, a) the necessity of fault grounds for divorce, and b)
heart balm causes of action, have both been abolished, it would be somewhat
anomalous to allow unrecorded antenuptial agreements to be enforced as a general
rule. Lest subjectivity subvert the order and reasonableness which a strictly enforced
rule promotes, doubt should be resolved strictly in favor of application of the Statue
of Frauds.
The evidence relating to Mr. Kirk's purported promise to financially take care
of Ms. Kirk upon their marriage is in dispute as shown by Mr. Kirk's testimony cited
above. Further, the evidence supports and the Trial Court foxmd, that the parties
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continued to manage their financial affairs separately during the marriage. Thus,
there was not even partial performance to show the promise was made. Also, the
alleged promise was never reduced to a written form signed by the parties. It would
be a gross injustice to require alimony from Mr. Kirk based on the disputed oral
promise. Yet, the Trial Court based a majority of its rationale in awarding alimony
on this purported promise of Mr. Kirk. The Trial Court abused its discretion as a
matter of law in doing so.
Prenuptial agreements are required to be written and subscribed under Utah
Code Section 25-5-4(3). The Trial Court's reliance in making its alimony award on
Mr. Kirk's disputed oral promise that he would financially replace Ms. Kirk's lost
alimony is contrary to Section 25-5-4. Such a promise does not meet the evidentiary
burden required by the Statute of Frauds and is therefore unenforceable. The Trial
Court thus, abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in making the award
on such basis. This Court should vacate the alimony award insofar as it is predicated
on Mr. Kirk's purported oral promise.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY BASED
ON A COMBINED STANDARD OF LIVING IN THAT THE
PARTIES NEVER ESTABLISHED NOR EXPERIENCED SUCH
A STANDARD DURING THEIR SHORT ONE YEAR
MARRIAGE.

The parties herein lived together from June 1,1991 to May 31,1992, a period
of only twelve months. During their entire marriage, they kept separate control over
their assets and income, and separate responsibility for their expenses.
The first six months, June to December, 1991, they lived in Ms. Kirk's rental
apartment. Ms. Kirk continued to make the rental payments, utilities and paid her
separate expenses and debts while Mr. Kirk paid his personal expenses.
The last six months, they lived in Mr. Kirk's residence. He continued to pay
his separate expenses while Ms. Kirk continued to use her First Interstate checking
account for income deposits and her personal expenditures.
Thus, the evidence as to the parties' combined standard of living was not
established due to the fact that each party kept and maintained his or her own
separate accounts.
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A number of decisions by this court and the Utah Supreme Court indicate that
a requisite condition for an alimony award include a finding concerning the parties'
combined standard of living. (See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Ut. App.
1991), Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116,121 (Ut. App. 1990), Morgan v. Morgan, 795
P.2d 684, 689 (Ut. App. 1990), Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124
(Ut. App. 1988), Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Ut. App. 1987), and Paffel v.
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100-01 (Utah 1986))
In the instant case, the parties did not combine their income in any way for the
purpose of meeting expenses. Each party kept their income and expenses separate
during their brief one year relationship. Yet, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
provide in Paragraph 37: "In considering the amount of permanent alimony that
should be paid to the plaintiff [sic, should read defendant], the Court has taken into
account...the life style in which the parties lived during the course of the marriage,
even though it was short."
In Paragraph 39 of its findings, the Trial Court states:
The Court finds that defendant's reasonable monthly Uving
expenses are $2,287 as reflected in her Exhibit D-25, which the Court
accepts and finds to be reasonable based upon the standard of living of
the parties during their marriage and the standard of living of the
defendant prior to her marriage to plaintiff.
Yet, neither the Trial Court in its findings, nor the evidence presented to it,
indicate; that the parties participated in any combined monetary standard of living
whatsoever to which a certain monetary sum was ascribed. Neither did the Trial
Court make any finding based on a dollar figure concerning Ms. Kirk's standard of
living prior to the parties' marriage.
The only standard of Uving the parties experienced during the marriage was
their separate ability to support themselves as they had done prior to their marriage.
They kept their income and expenses separate during their short one year
relationship. Thus, an alimony award of any amount is unjust in this case, given
that the parties experienced no combined standard of living dxiring their brief
relationship. The alimony award should be vacated in so far as it was premised upon
a combined standard of living, which standard is absent in the record.
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D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FULLY
RECOGNIZE THE RELEVANCE OF THE PARTIES' VERY
BRIEF MARRIAGE OF LESS THAN ONE YEAR IN MAKING
ITS ALIMONY AWARD.

In its Findings of Fact the Trial Court accurately noted, "This is a marriage of
relatively short duration, approximately one year. (Findings of Fact, first sentence
of Para. 5) Yet, it further found, "that defendant is entitled to permanent alimony
from plaintiff* even though the marriage was of short duration," and "[i]n considering
the amount of permanent alimony that should be paid to the plaintiff [sic, should
read defendant] the Court has taken into account...it was short." (Findings of Fact,
towards the end of Paragraph 37)
A review of other cases and the literature dealing with very short marriages
such as the instant matter, indicate that an award of $1,000 per month permanent
alimony was an abuse of discretion.
In Frank v. Frank, 419 P.2d 199 (Utah 1966) the Court dealt with a marriage
of like duration as the instant matter. While Mr. Frank challenged an alimony
award of $200 per month for three years, the Court stated,
We think the trial court arrived at an equitable conclusion in case
of a very short-lived marriage. The record indicates that on believable
evidence, neither party was in a very much different position financially
before and after the fortunate or unfortunate walk to the alter.
Neither are the parties in this matter in very much different position, either
prior to or after the marriage or following their divorce.
In Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984), the Court acknowledged the
important relevancy of a "marriage of short duration"

(3 & 1/2 years) in the

determination of an equitable alimony award: $200 per month for 24 months.
In McDonald v. McDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah 1951) the Court points
out that "[t]he time of duration of the marriage" is a "helpful" factor in the
determination of alimony.
Likewise, in Wilson v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1956) the Court stated
that in determining alimony, "it is necessary for the court to consider...the duration
of the marriage...." (emphasis added)
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In Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987), the Court noted that the
Trial Court's findings, "include the following language:"
That this was not a long term marriage, and the court feels that
each party is being restored to the condition which existed at the time
of the marriage, and therefor no alimony should be awarded. (Emphasis
added)
Likewise, where the parties marriage herein lasted only a year and they were
both substantially "restored to the condition which existed at the time of the
marriage," no alimony should have been awarded.
After reiterating the well known factors "to be examined in determining
alimony" contained in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) the Boyle Court
further states at 671:
In Jones the Court examined the record for an analysis of the
criteria, and considered among other things, the length of the marriage,
and the recipient spouse's education and employability. The Jones
analysis process made it clear that the three pronged criterion does not
preclude considering factors such as the length of the marriage in
awarding alimony. (Emphasis added)
Decision by Courts in other jurisdictions concur with and expand the above
analysis in regards to the relevancy of marriage brevity in considering alimony. In
Grimes v. Grimes, 472 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), the Court stated,
We thoroughly agree with the argument of the appellant that the
brevity of their marriage should be considered in determining the
amount of the alimony. Especially is this so where the parties come
under the category of mature citizens with no hope of having a family,
where in many instances, the parties are lonely and searching for
companionship. See 1 A.L.R.3d 6 §7(c)
In the instant matter, not only was the marriage very short, the parties are
both mature citizens, with no plan of having more children, and were both searching
for companionship to replace their loneliness.
The above noted A.L.R. reference in Grimes deals with, "Duration of marriage",
and includes the following:
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It has been said in a treatise on divorce: "The length of the
marriage is an important element which courts take into account in
awarding alimony. Obviously the longer a woman has lived with a man
and performed the functions which one normally expects from a wife,
the greater is her claim on him. To hold otherwise is to put the
golddigger, who marries a man for his money and then divorces him as
fast as she can get rid of him, on par with a woman who has spent most
of her adult years looking after a husband11 (emphasis added) [Quoting,
Ploscowe, The Truth About Divorce (1955) p. 193]
The Trial Court's alimony award in this case equates Ms. Kirk to a woman who
has foregone career opportunities, raised children of the marriage, and functioned
solely in a domestic role for numerous years. Ms. Kirk did none of these things
during the brief one year marriage. The $1000 per month permanent alimony award
is tantamount to an undeserved and unmerited life-time annuity.
Likewise, Utah's sister state, Arizona, recognized in Oppenheimer v.
Oppenheimer, 526 P.2d 762, 766 (Ariz. App. 1974):
While the length of the marriage is an important consideration,
its importance stems from two underlying considerations: The
contribution of the spouse to be supported and judicial resistance to
awarding spousal maintenance to a "golddigger". See Annot. 1 A.L.R.3d
6, 32 (1965) (emphasis added)
Ms. Kirk contributed nothing of the kind usually contributed by a spouse in a
long term marriage. In no way did Ms. Kirk relinquish career opportunities, nor
perform the long term domestic tasks normally associated with a permanent alimony
award of $1,000 per month. The Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony
award by effectively rewarding Ms. Kirk a gold mine in ending the marriage
relationship.
Though the Trial Court acknowledged the brevity of the parties' one year
marriage, it failed to give the short one year duration adequate consideration in
awarding alimony.

Such award, given the short duration of the marriage,

inappropriately rewards Ms. Kirk as a "golddigger", with an undeserved gold mine.
The alimony award should be reversed and remanded with instructions to
appropriately consider the limitations on alimony in view of the brevity of the
marriage.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
On several occasions, this Court has set forth the basis to determine whether

or not an award of attorney fees is justified:
To be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the requesting spouse must make
"a showing of financial need and reasonableness" of the fees incurred. Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 166, 1171 (Ut. App. 1990).
A number of other cases, mention the aforesaid criteria and further specify the
following list of factors which need to be considered by the trial court in determining
the reasonableness factor of attorneys fees:
1)
2)
3)
4)

The difficulty of the litigation,
The necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and
The result obtained.

(See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-4 (Ut. App. 1991), Morgan v. Morgan, 795
P.2d 684, 688 (Ut. App. 1990), Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425-6 (Ut. App.
1990), Sorensen u. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820,832 (Ut. App. 1989), Rasband u. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331,1336 (Ut. App. 1988), and Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-5 (Utah
1980))
In Bell, at 494, this Court further stated,
To permit meaningful review of the trial court's discretionary
ruling, "[w]e have consistently encouraged trial court to make findings
to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an
attorney fee award." (citations omitted)
Also in Bell, at 494, this Court pointed out that a significant factor in attorney
fee determination is which party prevailed on the main disputed issue in the case.
In Houmont, at 426, this Court noted, "If either financial need or
reasonableness has not been shown, we have reversed awards of attorney fees."
(emphasis added)
In Sorensen, at 832, this Court stated there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen's need, yet found "the proffered testimony insufficient to
sustain the award of attorney fees, and therefore, we reverse." Mrs. Sorensen's
counsel had proffered an exhibit reflecting the time spent and the rates charged.
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Opposing "counsel stipulated that the proffer could be received, but expressly refused
to stipulate to the "reasonableness of the fees." This Court reversed because of the
lack of evidence on the four factors cited above to determine overall reasonableness.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING MS. KIRK'S NEED
FOR ATTORNEY FEES.

The only testimony concerning Ms. Kirk's need for attorney fees is found at
TV2:154 L13-21. Ms. Kirk simply testified that in hiring her counsel, she had "made
some payments, but...haven't been able to pay it all."
Ms. Kirk's Financial Declaration shows she owns a condominium in Arizona.
She claims it does not generate a positive cash flow, yet admits its value of
$80,000.00 and having roughly $60,000.00 in equity. Certainly this equity, nearly ten
times the award of her fees and costs, could be easily used to satisfy obligations to
her counsel.
As noted above, during the nine month trial proceeding, Ms. Kirk was easily
able to pay $$517.21 per month to her counsel. Said sum is the average she paid as
reflected on her Exhibit 34, shown herein as Exhibit "I". In addition, while claiming
to have a $685.00 shortfall between her income and expenses, she not only met all
her expenses, but increased the total balance in her checking account by $2,588.51
to almost $8,000.00 while the underlying matter proceeded to trial.
There is no reason given this increase, the near $8,000.00 available to her, and
her ability to have averaged $517.21 per month in fee payment for nine months, that
she could not pay the $6,565.05 fee balance she owed. In addition, as argued above,
the aforementioned evidence supports that during the nine months preceding the
trial, Ms. Kirk averaged either a) over $1,200 per month income from undisclosed
sources, b) inflated her actual expenses by approximately $1,200 per month, or c) a
combination of the forgoing two aspects. She could continue paying $517.00 per
month and satisfy her attorney fees and costs in just one year.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHERE MS. KIRK FAILED TO
ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE THE REASONABLENESS OF HER
ATTORNEY FEE BASED ON FOUR REQUIRED FACTORS
DISCUSSED BELOW:

The Trial Court made no findings on the four required factors discussed below.
The only findings on attorney fees and costs are found in the first half of Paragraph
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51 and all of 52. Those findings are conclusory only. The findings'language merely
makes conclusions on the issues of need, ability and reasonableness. Thus, the
findings are inadequate on their face.
1.

THE DIFFICULTY OF THE LITIGATION

This case was not so complex or difficult as to merit a rate of $175.00 per hour
and a total fee of $11,229.97. This is particularly so when considering the result Ms.
Kirk obtained, which factor is treated separately below. Thus, the reasonableness
factor is not supported since the case was actually straightforward and relatively
simple. The case was not complex nor difficult. The Trial Court only disagreed with
Mr. Kirk on the issues of alimony and attorneys fees — issues which are not
inordinately difficult. Mr. Kirk of course, now seeks to have this court overturn the
Trial Court's decision on those two issues.
2.

THE NECESSITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE NUMBER
OF HOURS SPENT ON THE CASE.

Defendant's Exhibit 34, Exhibit "I" herein, provides no break down of how the
billable time was spent. It simply reflects a total of hours allegedly spent by Ms.
Kirk's counsel, two associates and a paralegal. Included in paralegal time is 30.65
hours at $50.00 per hour.

Nothing is provided as to what work the paralegal

allegedly performed during the 30.65 hours at a $50.00 per hour rate. No time logs
were submitted to support and specify how the time was spent. Thus, it is a mere
guess as to whether or not the time was necessary or reasonable.
3.

THE FEE CUSTOMARILY CHARGED IN THE LOCALITY FOR
SIMILAR SERVICES.

Though Ms. Kirk's counsel proffered that his "fees are $175.00 an hour,"
nothing was mentioned comparing this to the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar services. Such a comparison is required under Rasband, Bell, Morgan,
Houmont, Kerr, and Sorrensen. The Trial Court erred in failing to compare and
justify Ms. Kirk's counsel's fee to the significantly lower fee which is customarily
charged.
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4.

THE RESULT OBTAINED.

The Trial Court seriously erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to Ms. Kirk
when considering the result obtained. As noted above, this Court in Rasband, Bell,
Morgan, Houmont, Kerr, and Sorrensen, specifically stated that "the result obtained"
is a major deciding factor in the determination of whether or not attorneys fees are
reasonable.
The major issue between the parties in this matter decided at trial was the
division of property. In Paragraph 9 of its findings the Trial Court noted, "The
defendant asserts that...she is entitled to one-half of all the properties that were
designated to be included in the Kirk Family Trust."
In Defendant's Exhibit 12, "Proposed distribution of assets and Liabilities," Ms.
Kirk claimed that she was entitled to the sum of $242,493 from Mr. Kirk to equalize
the parties' values and realize her claim of one-half of the parties' property. The
Trial Court firmly rejected her claim, noting that both parties' premarital property
had been kept separate during their marriage and had never been commingled in a
prenuptial agreement by way of the Trust, which Trust was created solely as an
estate planning device.
By far the majority of the discovery, pre-trial preparation, testimony - including
supporting exhibits, and the trial memoranda, dealt with Ms. Kirk's claim for a sum
equal to one-half of the parties' property.

An inspection of both parties' Trial

Memoranda and Ms. Kirk's Reply Memorandum, the trial exhibits, and the
transcripts, support that approximately 85% of Ms. Kirk's fees were likely consumed
in advancing her property division claim, the issue upon which she failed to obtain
the result sought.
The Trial Memoranda are a good representation of what percentage of time
was consumed by the division of property issue.

An inspection of Mr. Kirk's

Memorandum (R.O.A. 60-81) show 16 pages (4-19) of the 19 pages (4-22) under the
Argument section addressing the property division issue.

Ms. Kirk's Trial

Memorandum (R.O.A. 114-124 of Case No. 92490 1796) shows 6 pages (3-8) of the 8
pages (3-10) under the Argument section addressing the property division issue. Ms.
Kirk's Reply Memorandum (R.O.A. 84-89) shows all 6 of its 6 pages addressing the
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same issue. Of the 33 pages contained under the Argument sections in the three
Memoranda, 28 pages were consumed with addressing the property division issue.
The 28 pages addressing solely this issue equals 85% of the 33 pages.
The Transcript of the summary argument held after trial on March 23, 1993
is also illustrative of the same percentage. Coimsel argued the property division,
alimony and attorney fee issues on pages 3 - 57 therein, 55 pages in total. The
property division issue consumes 45 pages, (3-27,33-43, and 49-47) while the alimony
and attorney fee issues take up only 10 pages (28-32 and 44-48). The 45 pages on
property division equals 82% of the 55 page total.
Yet, notwithstanding the Trial Court's agreement with Mr. Kirk on this major
issue which consumed roughly 80% of the fees incurred in the proceedings below,
Paragraph 51 of the Trial Court's findings state,
Defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees from plaintiff on the
basis that she is in need of assistance financially to meet those
attorney's fee obligations and that the plaintiff has the ability to assist
her in connection therewith. The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff
ought to be required to assist the defendant in meeting her attorney's
fee obligation not only for the reasons suggested by the defendant, that
is her need and the plaintiffs ability to pay, but based upon the
unreasonable approach that plaintiff has taken to the resolution of this
case, (emphasis added)
Mr. Kirk contended since the inception of this case that it was reasonable and
appropriate that each party have awarded to them the property they each owned
prior to their marriage. He argued that all their premarital property had been kept
separate during the marriage. More than 80% of the underlying proceedings dealt
with discovery, trial preparation, and testimony relating to the property division
issue. The Trial Court agreed with Mr. Kirk. He prevailed on the major disputed
issue in this matter. Clearly the majority of the time spent by Ms. Kirk's coimsel in
disputing this issue resulted in a denial of the relief she sought.
Ms. Kirk should not be awarded attorneys fees which were accumulated by
spending more than 80% of attorney/paralegal time on an unmerited claim. The Trial
Court erred in finding Mr. Kirk to be unreasonable when he prevailed on the major
issue before the Court. The Trial Court further erred in awarding attorneys fees on
the basis of Mr. Kirk purported "imreasonable approach". The result obtained on the
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major issue at trial does not merit an award of attorney fees to Ms. Kirk. Ms. Kirk's
unreasonable approach to the property division issue likely cost Mr. Kirk more than
80% of his attorney fees which he otherwise would not have incurred.
C.

THE MERE PROFFER BY MS. KIRK'S COUNSEL AS TO HER
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON THE FOUR ABOVE FACTORS.

Instead of providing evidence in relation to the above four factors, Ms. Kirk's
counsel simply made a "proffer on attorney fees" submitting Defendant's Exhibit 34,
herein Exhibit "I", as evidence thereof. (TV2:208 L4 to 210 Lll) When asked by the
Trial Court if Mr. Kirk's counsel had "[a]ny abjection to a proffer?" he responded, "I
don't have any objection to the proffer with the usual admonishment to the Court
that by accepting the proffer, we do not admit that Mr. Kirk should be obligated for
the same." The Trial Court then replied, "I take that as a given." Thus, the evidence
of Ms. Kirk's attorney fees is clearly inadequate under Sorrensen concerning proffered
testimony on such fees.
Without the required evidence in support of the four specific factors addressed
above, the proffer is insufficient to support reasonableness under Sorrensen and the
other cases cited above requiring such evidence. Ms. Kirk's counsel's mere proffer
that "the number of hours invested in this case were appropriate and reasonable"
(TV2:209 L9-10), does not make them so. Any attorney would certainly proffer a
belief that the time spent on every case was reasonable. Ms. Kirk's counsel's mere
proffer as to fee reasonableness is inadequate, just as the mere testimony, without
supporting evidence as to expenses by a spouse requesting alimony, is inadequate
under Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 546-7 (Ut. App. 1993) discussed above on the
alimony issue.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MS. KIRK'S FEES
TWICE.

the Trial Court mistakingly counted Ms. Kirk's costs twice. Such error shows
the undue hastiness in which the feeble evidence contained in Exhibit "I" herein was
accepted. The Exhibit states, "Total Costs Advanced: $592.47". That total is also
included in the "Total Services and Costs: $11,229.97". At the bottom of the Exhibit
it provides, "Total Balance Due: $6,565.05". The balance includes what Ms. Kirk
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owed on both attorney fees and costs. Yet, the Trial Court obviously misinterpreted
this Exhibit and awarded the costs as though they were in addition to the Total
Balance Due of $6565.05. The Trial Court's findings in Paragraph 52 state,
The Court determines those attorney's fees to be $6565, the
amount still due Mr. Dart after partial payment by the defendant
herein. The Court further determines that the defendant is entitled to
reimbursement of her legitimate costs incurred in this matter and as
reflected in the exhibit attached to [actually included in] defendant's
Exhibit D-34, in the total amount of $592.47.
The above finding obviously counted Ms. Kirk's costs twice, once in the Total
Balance Due and once separately. The Trial Court erred in counting Ms. Kirk's costs
in the double fashion.
Summary on attorneys fees and costs
The award of attorney fees and costs is unjustified. Ms. Kirk did not have
need of the award where she was able to a) meet all her alleged expenses including
her unsubstantiated $685 per month shortfall, and b) pay her coimsel an average of
$517.21 per month during the nine month trial proceeding, and c) increase her bank
balance by $2,588.51 to a total of almost $8,000. Her bank balance is obviously
sufficient to meet the $6,565 balance owed to her coimsel. She also has close to
$60,000.00 equity available in her condominium to satisfy her fees.
Further, the attorney fee and cost award is unjustified where she failed to
show the reasonableness thereof under the required factors of 1) the difficulty of the
litigation, 2) the necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and
particularly 4) the result obtained. Also, the mere proffer by Ms. Kirk's counsel is
insufficient to support the necessary evidence on the aforesaid four factors.
Ms. Kirk likely incurred at least 80% of her attorney fees arguing her
unmerited property division claim. Mr. Kirk likely incurred an equal percentage of
his attorney fees in defending against her unmerited claim. The Trial Court agreed
with Mr. Kirk's position concerning the property division issue, which issue consumed
by far the majority of both parties' attorney fee expenses for discovery, trial
preparation and the trial itself.
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The Trial Court incorrectly included Ms. Kirk's $592.47 in costs twice - once
separately and once included in the attorney fee award.
Thus, where neither Ms. Kirk's need for attorneys fees and costs, nor the
reasonableness of such fees and costs were shown, the award of the fees and costs, with
the costs counted twice, is clearly erroneous and should be reversed and vacated. In
the alternative, the award should be reversed and remanded to assess her need in light
of the $1,200 discrepancy, her bank balance, and her condominium equity, along with
instruction to assess beyond a mere proffer the four factors discussed above.
CONCLUSION
This Court should a) reverse and vacate because the findings are clearly
erroneous, or b) reverse and remand the award of alimony, attorneys fees, and costs
as requested in the italics portion at the conclusion of each section above.
The alimony award should be reversed and vacated, or reversed and remanded,
on the following factors:
a)

Ms. Kirk's need,

b)

Ms. Kirk's ability to provide sufficient income for herself,

c)

Mr. Kirk's ability to pay,

d)

The replacement theory is error of law,

e)

Enforcement of the purported oral promise is contrary to the Statute of
Frauds,

f)

The parties never established nor experienced a combined standard of
living, and

g)

Adequate consideration of the brevity of the marriage.

The award of attorneys fees and costs should be reversed and vacated, or
reversed and remanded, on the following factors:
a)

Ms. Kirk's need,

b)

Ms. Kirk's ability to pay,

c)

Mr. Kirk's ability to pay,

d)

The reasonableness of the fees and costs considering:
1)

The difficulty of the litigation,

41

2)

The necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent
on the case,

3)

The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services,
and

4)
e)

The result obtained,

The mistake of awarding Ms. Kirk's fees twice.

Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1994.

Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Plaintifl/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of June, 1994, I mailed by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:
Bert L. Dart, #818
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
310 South Main Street, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT "A"

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written
and signed.
The following agreements are void unless the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making of
the agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking
made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
(4) every special promise made by an executor
or administrator to answer in damages for the
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate;
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation;
(6) every credit agreement.
(a) As used in Subsection (6):
(i) "Credit agreement" means an
agreement by a financial institution to
lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or things
in action, to otherwise extend credit, or
to make any other financial accommodation. "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary agreements related to deposit accounts or
overdrafts or other terms associated
with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a
financial accommodation under a credit
agreement with a debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who
seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial accommodation, under
a credit agreement with a financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means p
state or federally chartered bank, savings and loan association, savings bank,
industrial loan corporation, credit
union, or any other institution under the
jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions as provided in Title
7, Financial Institutions Act of 1981.
(b) A debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless
the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and
conditions, and is signed by the party
against whom enforcement of the agreement
would be sought. For purposes of this act, a
signed application constitutes a signed
agreement, if the creditor does not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement

from the debtor when granting the application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise
to a claim that a credit agreement is created,
unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice
by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with
a debtor; or
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other business relationships
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a
clearly stated typewritten or printed provision giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of the
agreement between the creditor and debtor
and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral
agreement. The provision does not have to be
on the promissory Bote or other evidence of
indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
1W9

ing the course of the action or in the final order or
judgment.
1993

30-3-3.

Award of costs, attorney and witness
fees — Temporary alimony. *

(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4,
or 6, and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may order a
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees,
including expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the
action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the
party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court
may order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in
the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry
of the final order or judgment may be amended dur-

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to have
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification [Effective until January 1,1994].
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
"divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
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liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses, and
(in) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate
family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing
party in that action, if the court determines that the
petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or
other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12 2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or
exercise court-ordered visitation
1993

30-3-5

EXHIBIT "B"

Third Judical Dltlriet*

M A Y - 4 1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

OTIS B. KIRX, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PEGGIE M. KIRK
Defendant.

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
: CASE NO. 924901796
:
:
:

The above-referenced divorce action was before the Court in
consolidated case number 924901709.

Prior to the trial in this

matter, the Court consolidated a companion case where the plaintiff
had filed for divorce in number 924901796, treating the second
filed lawsuit as a counterclaim in the original surviving action.
Following the taking of evidence in this matter and closing
arguments, the matter was submitted to the Court for decision. The
Court took the matter under advisement to consider the testimony
offered by the parties and their witnesses, the arguments of
counsel both oral and written, and the legal authorities submitted
by the parties in support of their respective positions. The Court
has considered those matters, along with the documentary evidence
received during the course of the trial, and being fully advised,
enters the following Memorandum Decision.
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is a marriage of relatively short duration, approximately
one year.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant had been married

before the instant marriage.

Plaintiff Otis B. Kirk, Jr. had, a

short time before this marriage, lost his former wife as a result
of her death.

The defendant Peggie M. Kirk had been a friend of

the plaintiff's deceased wife prior to and at the time of her
death.

At the time of the instant marriage, the defendant was

divorced from her prior husband and was receiving permanent alimony
in the sum of $800.00 per month.
The plaintiff, after the death of his first wife, actively
courted the defendant.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff's

courting of the defendant was aggressive.

The defendant was

reluctant to remarry, being concerned regarding her financial
status.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant are in their mid-

60's, and neither is actively employed.

The defendant works part-

time on an irregular basis, earning little income.
has

substantial

available

The plaintiff

income from his various premarital

investments and retirement programs.
Prior to the marriage the evidence supports the finding and
the Court does find that the defendant while certainly not wealthy,
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was financially comfortable and reasonably secure relating to her
financial matters.
The evidence is clear and the Court finds that when confronted
with the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the reasons stated
above, the plaintiff promised the defendant that she would not need
to worry financially, that he would "take care of her" in a
financial setting. In support of and to encourage the defendant to
marry the plaintiff, the plaintiff revealed to the defendant his
substantial financial holdings.

On continued pressure to enter

into

the

a

satisfied

marriage
based

relationship,
upon

the

defendant

plaintiff's

ultimately

representations

was
that

remarriage at her stage of life under the circumstances then
existing would not effect her financial stability, even though she
would lose her permanent alimony.

Based upon the foregoing, she

agreed to marry the plaintiff.
Following marriage, the parties lived in the defendant's
apartment while the plaintiff remodeled his residence where he and
his first wife lived for many years.

After completion of the

remodeling, the parties moved in to the remodeled residence and
following a period of time their relationship deteriorated to a
point of separation.
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The position of the plaintiff is that all of the properties
that he owned, both real, personal and financial accounts, are his
sole and separate property and should be returned to him in this
divorce proceeding.

The plaintiff, while acknowledging that he

made representations and promises to the defendant to induce her to
enter into the marriage relationship, resists the defendant's
claims that she is entitled to share in his premarital property.
In addition to the plaintiff's position that all of the properties,
real, personal and financial accounts that he either owned or
inherited prior to his marriage to the defendant should be returned
to him, the plaintiff also asserts that the defendant is not
entitled to alimony, nor any of the other monetary considerations
that she has requested, and rejects any suggestion that he should
assist her in attorney's fees.
The defendant asserts that as a result of the promises of the
plaintiff to induce her to enter into the marriage relationship and
as a result of the creation of the Kirk Family Trust, an exhibit in
this matter, that she is entitled to one-half of all the properties
that were designated to be included in the Kirk Family Trust. Some
of the properties designated in the Kirk Family Trust were actually
transferred to the Trust, some were not*
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The defendant further asserts in the alternative that should
the property of the plaintiff be determined by this Court to be
premarital and not subject to division, that she is entitled to
substantial alimony based upon the promises and representations of
the plaintiff in view of what she gave up in the form of permanent
alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff, as well as on the basis
of need.

The defendant also seeks miscellaneous expenses and sums

that she attributes to the plaintiff's insistence that she enter
into the marital relationship. The defendant requests an award of
attorney's fees as well.

RESIDENCY AND GROUNDS
Based

upon the testimony

of the parties, the Court is

satisfied that the requirements of residency have been established
and that there exists sufficient grounds to terminate this marriage
on the basis of irreconcilable differences.

The divorce will be

final upon the signing and entry of the final divorce Decree in
this matter.

PROPERTY DIVISION
With the exception of a condominium in Arizona and other minor
premarital property assets, the bulk of the real property and
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financial assets in dispute in these proceedings were acquired by
the plaintiff prior to the marriage between he and the defendant.
After considering the relevant authorities, the written and oral
arguments of the parties, the Court is satisfied, using the
appropriate criteria announced by the appellate courts of this
state, that the property held by the plaintiff, both real and
personal, as well as the property held by the defendant, both real
and personal, prior to the entry of the marriage ought to be
returned to each as their sole and separate property.
The Court is satisfied that to the extent the defendant makes
claim

against

the

defendant's

premarital

property, that the

inclusion of some of the plaintiff's premarital property and the
suggestion that a substantial additional amount would be included
in the Kirk Family Trust does not change the character of the
property from premarital or inherited property to that of joint
property. Clearly, the plaintiff's property was accumulated either
through premarital efforts or inheritance prior to his marriage to
the defendant, as was the defendant's premarital properties. The
Court is constrained to reject the proposition asserted by the
defendant that the establishment of the Kirk Family Trust after the
marriage constituted a prenuptial agreement for dissolution of the
parties' assets should a divorce occur. To the contrary, the Court
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is satisfied that the establishment of the Kirk Family Trust was an
estate planning device and so contemplated by the parties.
It does not appear to the Court and the Court does not find
that there was ever a contemplated gift between the parties of
their premarital assets, even though some of those assets of the
plaintiff and a majority of the assets of the defendant were
transferred into the aforementioned Trust.

The Trust did not

contemplate divorce, but rather provided for the respective parties
should one predecease the other. For the reasons suggested by the
plaintiff in his written materials, as well as those suggested by
his counsel in oral argument, the Court rejects the position
asserted by the defendant that she is entitled to one-half of the
properties that were included in or designated to be included in
the Kirk Family Trust.
Any properties that have been transferred into the Kirk Family
Trust are to be returned to the original owner to be held as that
party's sole and separate property, based upon the determination of
this Court that those properties are premarital and not subject to
distribution in this divorce.
ALIMONY
While the Court has determined that the plaintiff's promises
to the defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert a legal
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claim against the plaintiff's premarital properties, the Court is
satisfied that the plaintiff's promises which induced the defendant
to give up financial security are enforceable. The plaintiff made
promises of financial security to the defendant to induce her to
enter into the marriage relationship. The Court is satisfied that
she would not have entered into the marital relationship except for
the promises

of

the plaintiff

that

she would

be reasonably

financially secure should she agree to give up her sources of
income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior spouse and
enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff.
plaintiff made a promise which he acknowledges.
significant

as

far

as

the defendant

was

The

The promise was

concerned,

and the

plaintiff ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience
and in equity.

This Court therefore determines that the defendant

is entitled to permanent alimony from the plaintiff even though the
marriage was of short duration.
In considering the amount of permanent alimony that should be
paid to the defendant, the Court has taken into account the limited
ability of the defendant to earn income, her age, and her needs, as
w e l l a s t h e style in which the parties lived during the course of
the marriage, even though it was short.

The defendant gave up a

comfortable apartment, many of her personal pieces of property at
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of the plaintiff, and of course gave up her

alimony

income

from her

former

husband.

She has

submitted expenses which she will be required to expend ongoing,
which the Court finds reasonable.

The defendant does, however,

have income from social security which she did not have prior to
the marriage.
The plaintiff has substantial ability to assist the defendant
in meeting her monthly expenses, and to provide for her financial
well-being in accordance with his premarital promises.

Over the

years, the plaintiff has acquired substantial financial assets in
the form of investments and retirements. He owns or is a mortgage
holder on real properties.
by his own choice.

His own personal expenses are minimal

Further by his own choice, the plaintiff does

not draw against his retirement or other assets, even though he has
the ability to do so.

It is clear to the Court that the plaintiff

has the financial ability to assist the defendant in the form of
permanent alimony.
Based upon the needs of the defendant and the financial
abilities of the plaintiff, also based upon what the defendant gave
up when entering into the marriage, and considering the promises
made to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the reasonable needs of
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the defendant, the Court is satisfied that an ongoing alimony
requirement in the sum of $1,000.00 per month is necessary and
reasonable.

Alimony will continue until such time as it is

terminated under the usual and customary circumstances.

MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
The defendant by way of Exhibit 27 and other testimony has
suggested that as a result of the demands of the plaintiff, she
disposed of certain property that she owned and enjoyed prior to
the marriage.

The defendant has assigned a value to the property

items listed on Exhibit 27 which, with the exception of the moving
costs of separation, the Court finds are not the fair market value
of the property.
The personal properties identified, such as the washer and
dryer, antique piano, dining room set, art work, and the sewing
machine, were all given as gifts to the parties' children, and the
amounts by way of value placed upon the individual pieces of
property, with the exception of perhaps the antique piano, are not
reflective of their current value.

While it is undisputed that

these items of personal property were given by the defendant to her
children and the plaintiff's son at the time of the move into the
remodeled home, the Court is unable to determine any legal or
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equitable basis upon which the plaintiff ought to pay for the value
of those properties. That would include the washer and dryer which
was given to the plaintiff's son. In addition, the Court is unable
to find any legal or equitable basis upon which the plaintiff
should be required to reimburse the defendant for moving costs, and
accordingly the sums sought by the defendant from the plaintiff as
represented on Exhibit 27 are rejected by the Court.
The defendant has requested certain items to be returned to
her as listed on Exhibit 26. The plaintiff resists the return of
some of the items. The Court is satisfied that to the extent that
items 1 through 21 on Exhibit 26 are in the plaintiff's possession,
they should be returned to the defendant forthwith.
The plaintiff has suggested that he paid on behalf of the
defendant certain sums prior to the marriage, and identified those
in his testimony as medical treatment for the defendant, paying off
defendant's obligation to Chase Visa, a medical bill at Cottonwood
Center, and the purchase of a wedding ring for the defendant. The
Court finds those to have been gifts from the plaintiff to the
defendant, and to the extent that the plaintiff seeks reimbursement
or credit in some other fashion for those amounts, that claim is
rejected by the Court.
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The defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees from the
plaintiff

on

the

basis

that

she

is

in

need

of

assistance

financially to meet those attorney's fee obligations, and that the
plaintiff has the ability to assist her in connection therewith.
The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff ought to be required to
assist the defendant in meeting her attorney's fee obligation, not
only for the reasons suggested by the defendant, that is, her need
and the plaintiff's ability to pay, but based upon the unreasonable
approach that the plaintiff has taken to the resolution of this
case.
Plaintiff's suggestion that the parties should be required to
merely take what they brought into the marriage and walk away with
no further financial obligations between them is disingenuous.
This is particularly true in view of the aggressive nature of the
courting of the defendant by the plaintiff, and his promises to her
to induce her to enter into the marital relationship. While fault
for the deterioration of the marriage is not an issue in this case,
the Court is satisfied that for whatever reasons only known to the
plaintiff, he apparently had second thoughts after the marriage
regarding the propriety of his original conduct, and that that for
the most part caused the dissolution of the relationship between
the parties.
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For those reasons, together with those suggested by the
defendant,

the

Court

is

satisfied

that

the

attorney's

fees

testified to by Mr. Dart are reasonable and were necessarily
incurred in this case, and that the plaintiff should be required to
pay to the defendant for the use and benefit of her attorney the
sums proffered by Mr. Dart at the conclusion of the evidence in
this case.

The Court determines those attorney's fees to be

$6,565.00, the amount still due Mr. Dart after partial payment by
the defendant herein.

The Court further determines that the

defendant is entitled to reimbursement of her legitimate costs
incurred in this matter.
The parties' counsel are directed to collaborate in preparing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that would put into effect
the decisions of this Court as contained

in this Memorandum

Decision.

Mr. Dart take the

The

Court would

request

that

responsibility for the initial draft, to be supplemented by Mr.
Mitsunaga, particularly on the issue where Mr. Mitsunaga's client
has prevailed, to wit: the issue of premarital property. Once the
documents have been prepared and approved as to form, the Court
would request that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
the final Decree be submitted to the Court for its review and
signature and filing as may be appropriate.
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To the extent that it is not otherwise indicated herein, the
Court would require in the final papers that each party be required
to execute the necessary documents of title or other evidence of
ownership

necessary to return the properties, both real and

personal, to their individual owners. That would be a requirement
imposed by the Court on the parties both in their individual
capacity, as well as their capacity pr
Family Trust.
Dated this

trustee under the Kirk

/
/day of May, X 9 9 3 -

,0^.

'TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDG

ATTEST
Deputy Cte*

00104

KIRK V, KIRK

PAGE FIFTEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this

H~ day of

May, 1993:

Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Plaintiff
731 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
B, L. Dart
Attorney for Defendant
310 S. Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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By,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
000OOO000

OTIS B. KIRK, JR.,

v.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PEGGIE M. KIRK,

Civil No. 924901796DA

Plaintiff,

Defendant•

Judge Timothy R. Hanson
000OOO000

The above-referenced divorce action was before the Court
consolidated with case No. 92-4901709.
this matter the Court consolidated

Prior to the divorce in

a companion case where the

plaintiff had filed for divorce in case No. 92-4901796, treating
the

second

filed

law suit as a

counterclaim

in the

original

surviving action.
Trial was held on the 9th day of March,
closing argument on the 23rd day of March, 1993.

1993, with

Following the

talcing of evidence in this matter and closing arguments the matter
was submitted to the Court for decision.

The Court took this

matter under advisement to consider the testimony offered by the
parties and their witnesses, the arguments of counsel both oral and
written and the legal authorities submitted by the parties in
support of their respective positions.

The Court has considered

those matters along with the documentary evidence received during
the

course

of

the

trial

and

being

fully

advised

enters

the

following:
r

-• ~9

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both plaintiff and defendant are residents of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three
months before the filing of this action and the Court is satisfied
that the requirements of residency have been established*
2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other

in Jackson, Wyoming, on the 2nd day of June, 1991, and since that
time have been husband and wife.
3.

Both

parties

testified

to

disagreements

and

arguments and a growing apart which resulted in their differences
becoming irreconcilable.

Each of the parties is entitled to a

divorce on their respective Complaint and Counterclaim on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, to become final upon signing
and entry.
4.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage

and none are expected and there are no issues of child custody or
child support.
5.

This is a marriage of relatively short duration,

approximately one year.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant had

been married before the instant marriage. Plaintiff, Otis B. Kirk,
Jr., had a short time before this marriage lost his former wife as
a result of her death.

The defendant, Peggie M. Kirk, had been a

friend of the plaintiff's deceased wife prior to and at the time of
death.

At the time of the instant marriage the defendant was

divorced from her prior husband and was receiving permanent alimony
in the sum of $200 a week, or $860 per month.
2

The plaintiff after the death of his first wife
actively

courted

plaintiffs

the defendant.

courting

of the

It is undisputed

defendant

was

that the

aggressive.

The

defendant was reluctant to marry being concerned regarding her
financial status.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant are in

their mid-601s and neither is actively employed in any substantial
way.

The defendant works part-time on an irregular basis earning

little income. The plaintiff has substantial available income from
his various premarital investments and retirement programs.
Prior to the marriage the evidence supports the
finding and the Court does find that defendant while certainly not
wealthy, was financially comfortable and reasonably secure relating
to her financial matters.
The evidence is clear and the Court finds that when
confronted with the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the
reasons stated above, that plaintiff promised the defendant that
she would not need to worry financially, that he would take care of
her

in

a

financial

circumstances

where

setting.
she

had

This promise
shared

with

him

was made under
her

financial

information and provided him with her tax returns going back
several years.

In support of and to encourage the defendant to

marry the plaintiff, the plaintiff revealed to the defendant his
substantial financial holdings.

Both parties testified that just

prior to the marriage they discussed and agreed to put all of their
property into a trust for their mutual benefit so that what was his
was hers and what was hers was his. On continued pressure to enter
3

into

a

marriage

relationship,

the

defendant

ultimately

was

satisfied based upon the plaintifffs representations that marriage
at her stage in life under the circumstances then existing would
not effect her financial stability even though she would lose her
permanent alimony. Based on the foregoing, she agreed to marry the
plaintiff.
6,

Shortly following the parties' marriage on June 2,

1991, they entered

into the execution of a Trust Agreement,

introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-l.

Schedule "A" of the Trust

described the assets conveyed into the Trust which essentially
included all of the assets of the parties. Following the execution
of the Trust Agreement, some of the properties, including all of
the real properties of the parties, the plaintiff's checking
account with Valley Bank and Trust, account no. 02-3 0406-65 and a
Franklin U.S. Government Securities Fund, account no. 10178837808
were transferred into the Trust. While plaintiff promised that he
would place the remaining assets into the Trust, those transfers
never occurred as the plaintiff testified that he had not had time
to do it.
7.

After

the marriage,

the

parties

lived

in the

defendant's apartment while the plaintiff remodeled his residence
where he and his first wife had lived for many years.

Defendant

was actively involved in the remodeling process in providing color
coordination advice and designer advice and some physical labor.
After completion of the remodeling, the parties moved into the

4

remodeled

residence

and

following

a

period

of

time

their

relationship deteriorated to the point of separation.
8.
properties

The position of the plaintiff is that all of the

that he owned, both real, personal and financial

accounts, are his sole and separate property and should be returned
to

him

in

this

divorce

proceeding.

The

plaintiff,

while

acknowledging that he made representations and promises to the
defendant to induce her to enter into the marriage relationship,
resists the defendant's claim that she is entitled to share in his
premarital property.

In addition to the plaintiff's position that

all of the properties, inherited prior to his marriage to the
defendant should be returned to

him, the plaintiff also asserts

that the defendant is not entitled to alimony, nor any of the other
monetary considerations that she has requested, and rejects any
suggestion that he should assist her in attorney's fees.
9.

The defendant asserts that as a result of the

promises of the plaintiff to induce her to enter into the marriage
relationship and as a result of the creation of the Kirk Family
Trust, an exhibit in this matter, that she is entitled to one-half
of all the properties that were designated to be included in the
Kirk Family Trust.

Some of the properties designated in the Kirk

Family Trust were actually transferred to the Trust, some were not.
The defendant further asserts in the alternative
that should the property of the plaintiff be determined by this
Court to be premarital and not subject to division, that she is
entitled

to substantial

alimony based upon the promises and
5

representations of the plaintiff in view of what she gave up in the
form of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff, as
well

as

on the

miscellaneous
plaintifffs
relationship.

basis

expenses
insistence

of need.
and

The

sums that

that

she

defendant
she

enter

also

seeks

attributes

to the

into

marital

the

The defendant requests an award of attorney's fees

as well.
10.

The plaintiff has acquired various and sundry items

of property prior to the date of marriage. The following property,
real and personal are:
A.

Residence: 3518 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This is a resident structure with 1.25 acres.
It was purchased by the plaintiff and his deceased
wife in 1956 and fully paid off in 1980.

The

property is now encumbered by a construction loan
for approximately $59,000.00.
B.

Strip of land: This is a one foot wide protection
strip granted by Salt Lake County and is adjacent
and contiguous to the lot upon which the residence
(paragraph 22(a) is situated and was purchased at
the same*time.

C.

Lewis contract: This is a real estate contract on
the sale of real property acquired by the plaintiff
and his deceased wife in 1966.

The real estate

contract was entered into December 5, 1980.

6

Pensions and retirement (Monthly):
(Legend: I, inherited from deceased wife, PMS,
premarital source)
Carpenter Union P/M/S

$

64.00

Boise Cascade P/M/S

676.00

U.S. West I

423.00

Dividends - Interest (Monthly):
Mountain American CU I

2.16

Putnam IRA P/M/S

158.65

Boise Cascade Supplemental Savings

631.40

U.S. Government Security (Jt)

465.00

Alliance Government Reserve (Jt)
No. american Service Trusts
Thomson Growth Fund

(Jt)

2.30
162.50
0

AT&T I

4.04

Ameritech I

8.20

Bell Atlantic I

11.34

Bell South I

7.42

NYNEX

11.37

Pactel I

7.42

South West Bell

7.66

U.S. West I

41.38

Social Security:
Social Security P/M/S
Valley bank checking

7

869.00
P/M/S

This

is

the

only

checking

account

plaintiff before and after the marriage.

used

by

the

Two

transfers were made by the plaintiff into
this checking account:
1.

December 7, 1990 - monies from deceased wife's
retirement

2.

$20,176.00

Feb. 1991 - monies from deceased wife's
retirement

$14,269.66

H.

Retirements, pensions & Stock (Exhibit 9):

1.

Mountain Credit Union I

2.

Putnam IRA P/M/S

3.

Putnam IRA Cash account

4.

Boise Cascade Supplemental

23,432.98

Retirement JT
5.

650.00

96,943.00

Franklin U.S. Government
Security Fund P/M/S
U.S. government Securities North Am Service Trust P/M/S

7.

Alliance Government Reserve P/M/S

8.

Mainstay Family of Funds P/M/S

9.

Thomson Fund

10.

AT&T Stock I

35.6130 shares

11.

Ameritech I

26.440

"

12.

Bell Atlantic I

51.0970

"

13.

Bell South I

39.1420

"

14.

NYNEX

27.6860

"

8

31,745.00

15.

Pactel I

40.7050

16.

Southwest Bell I

29.3840

ff

17.

U.S. West I

37.3090

,f

18.

U.S.-West I

68.000

19.

U.S. West I

252.00

I.

Vehicles: (Inherited and pre-marital)

1.

1980 Chevrolet

2.

1981 Toyota

3.

1968 Nomad Trailer

4.

1975 Yamaha motorcycle

11.

Defendantf s Property:

"

"
"

It is equally without

dispute and uncontroverted that Ms. Kirk had the following premarital property.
1.

Condominium 7018 No. Barbados
in Phoenix, Arizona
Market Value

2.

Household furniture and fixtures

3.

1983 Lincoln Continental Mark VT

4.

First Interstate, checking account
#21-28727-1

5.

12.

First Interstate checking
#28-16407-7
Balance
"Peggie M. Kirk11
"Otis B.^Kirk"

$80,000.00

66.53
9,537.00

The aforesaid properties described in Paragraph 10

and Paragraph 11 were acquired by each as indicated prior to the
instant marriage and without any contribution of either spouse to
the

other

and

absent

any

efforts

of

accumulation or enhancement of the same.
9

either

party

towards

13.

The pre-marital property ought to be returned to

each as his or her sole and separate property.
14.

The trust Schedule A recites and describes the real

estate which was placed in the Trust. Thus, the residence located
in Salt Lake County, the Lewis Contract, Condominium in Maripose
County, Arizona, and small protection strip of land was so placed.
15.

Schedule A continues on page 2 to describe the

accounts place in the Trust.

Of the total accounts listed, only

two accounts were, in fact, placed into the Trust by executing the
necessary documents to convert the accounts from the plaintifffs
name of plaintiff's name and former wife's name to the Kirk Family
Trust.
16.

These accounts were money market checking account,

Valley Bank & Trust, Account #02-30-406-65 and Franklin U.S.
Government Securities Fund Investment account No. 10178837808.
17.

The remaining accounts listed in Schedule A, page 2,

were not placed into the Trust due to the plaintiff's preoccupation
with remodeling tasks.
18.

The transfer of the real property by either party

and the transfer of the accounts by

either party into the trust

does not change the character of the pre-marital or inherited
property to that of joint property.
19.

The accumulation of the plaintiff's property were

through the pre-marital efforts of himself and his deceased wife
prior to the instant marriage, as was the defendant's pre-marital
property.
10

20.

The establishment of the Kirk Family Trust is not

and cannot be construed as a pre-nuptial agreement which would
purportedly govern the rights of the parties should a divorce
occur.
21.

The Kirk Family Trust was an estate planning device

and was so contemplated by the parties.
22.
and

That the assets transferred in part by the plaintiff

the majority

of the assets

of the defendant

was never

contemplated as a gift between the parties of his or her premarital assets to the other.
23.

The Trust did not contemplate divorce but rather

provided for the respective parties should one predecease the
other.
24.

The placement of defendant's name on the plaintiff's

Valley Bank account No. 913213945 as a joint signatory does not
amount to co-mingling of those funds.

The same holds true on the

placing of the plaintiff's name on the defendant's checking account
at First Interstate No. 28-16407-7.
25.

The adding of each other's names to his or her

separate bank account was in form, not substance, i.e.: each party
continued to treat his or her account as his or her separate
incomes and withdrawals for their separate expenses.
26.

This treatment is consistent with the fact that each

continued to treat his or her pre-marital bank accounts as they had
Drior to the marriage.

11

27.

The fact that plaintiff made payments for the

majority of the party's joint living expenses form the Valley Bank
does not alter the practice and interest of the parties to keep and
maintain his or her bank account separate and apart.
28.

The defendant contributed nothing to the day to day

living expenses from her First Interstate Account.
29.

There was no co-mingling of the parties separate

30.

The placement of the other party1s names by either

incomes•

party does not establish that a gift was intended by the transferor
to the transferee.
31.

There was no intent of either party to divest

himself or herself of all dominion and control to the other.
32.

Transfer to the Kirk Family Trust was not a transfer

to the other party as an individual.
33.

Both

parties

were

recipients

as

a

trustees governed by the terms of the Trust Agreement.

designated
It was an

interest which would become vested upon the death of either party.
34.

The Trust Agreement, by its terms, is revocable by

either party, although neither had done so at the time of the
divorce.
35.

The defendant was under a temporary restraining

order not to transfer any of the marital assets.
36.

All property that have been transferred into the

Kirk Family Trust should be returned to the original owners to be
held as his or her sole and separate property.
12

37.

While the Court has determined that the plaintiff's

promises to the defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert
a legal claim against the plaintifffs premarital properties, the
Court is satisfied that the plaintifffs promises which induced the
defendant to give up financial security are enforceable.

The

plaintiff made promises of financial security to the defendant to
induce her to enter into the marriage relationship.
satisfied

that

she would

not have entered

The Court is

into the marital

relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff that she
would be reasonably financially secure should she agree to give up
her sources of income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior
spouse and enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff made a promise which he acknowledges. The promise is
significant

as far as the defendant was concerned,

and the

plaintiff ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience
and in equity.

In addition, defendant is in need of alimony. Her

resources are not sufficient to meet that need and plaintiff is
financially

capable

of

hereinafter set forth.

providing

alimony

to

defendant

as

Furthermore, it does not appear that

defendant due to her current circumstances and age will be able to
rehabilitate herself so that in the foreseeable future she will be
capable of meeting her own financial needs. This Court, therefore,
letermines that defendant is entitled to permanent alimony from
)laintiff even though the marriage was of short duration.
In considering the amount of permanent alimony that
hould be paid to the plaintiff, the Court has taken into account
13

the limited ability of the defendant to earn income, her age and
her needs as well as the style in which the parties lived during
the course of the marriage, even though it was short.

The

defendant gave up a comfortable apartment, many of her personal
pieces of property at the insistence of the plaintiff, and of
course gave up her permanent alimony income from her former
husband.
38.

Defendants current income consists of her income

from her employment, which net after expenses is $256 a month based
upon the 1992 income tax return.
security.

She receives $496 in social

She has a condominium in Arizona which she rents for

$700 but after payment of the underlying mortgage and condominium
assessment, there actually is no net income from this property and,
in fact, the net expense is $62 a month. Defendant's total monthly
income without benefit of alimony from plaintiff is only the sum of
$690 a month.

This income was set out in defendant's Exhibit 24,

which the Court accepts.
39.

The Court finds that defendant's reasonable monthly

living expenses are $2,287 as reflected in her Exhibit D-25, which
the Court accepts and finds to be reasonable based upon the
standard of living of the parties during their marriage and the
standard of living of the defendant prior to her marriage to
plaintiff.
40.

The Court finds that plaintiff has substantial

ability to assist the defendant in meeting her monthly expenses and
to provide for her financial well being in accordance with his
14

premarital promises•
substantial

Over the years the plaintiff has acquired

financial assets

retirements.

in the

form of

investments and

He owns or is a mortgage holder on real property.

The balance sheet prepared by him as of July 15, 1992, and
introduced as Exhibit D-18, reflects assets having a net equity of
over $500,000.

His own personal expenses are minimal by his own

choice and as reflected under Exhibit P-3 setting forth his list of
monthly expenses only come to $2,319 a month.
1992

Plaintiff's income

as reflected

in the

income tax return

of the parties

introduced as

Exhibit D-29 and an analyzed by E. J. Passey, CPA,

as set forth in Exhibit D-33, shows that he receives social
security payments each year of $10,200, retirement plan payments
each year of $14,000 and interest and dividend income each year
based upon the 1992 tax return of $25,184. The combined amounts of
these sources of income are $49,384 or $3,497.67 per month.
By his own choice, plaintiff does not draw against
his retirement or other assets even though he has the ability to do
so.

It is clear to the Court that the plaintiff has the financial

ability to assist the defendant in the form of permanent alimony.
41.

Based upon the needs of the defendant and the

financial abilities ofAthe plaintiff, also based upon what the
defendant gave up when entering into the marriage and considering
the promises made to the defendant by the plaintiff and reasonable
needs of the defendant, the Court is satisfied that an ongoing
alimony requirement in the sum of $1,000 per month is necessary and
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reasonable,

which

alimony

should

continue

until

such time as

defendant should remarry, cohabit or the death of either party,
42.

The

defendant,

through

Exhibit

27

and

other

testimony suggests that as a result of the plaintiff's demand, she
disposed of certain property that she owned and enjoyed prior to
the marriage.
43.

With the exception

of the moving

expenses, the

following are found to as indicated:
(1)

Washer/dryer was purchased in 1970 and sold to

(2)

Antique piano given to the defendant in 1980

son.

and given to defendant's daughter in Hawaii.
(3)

Dining room set consisting of a buffet, 12

years old; table, 40 years old; chairs, 15 years old.
(4)

Art

work

(Sante

Fe

Gallery)

given

to

defendant's daughter, Pam.
(5)

Sewing machine, purchased 12 years ago, given

to defendant's daughter, Leslie.
(6)

Sheepskin rug was ruined. It was purchased 11-

12 years ago.
44.

In all ojf the foregoing items, the Court could not

find that a market value as opposed to replacement as purported by
the defendant, was established.
reflecting of their current value.
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Nor was the replacement value

45.

Nor was the Court unable to determine any legal or

equitable basis upon which to order the plaintiff to pay for the
value of those properties.
46.
in

that

The moving costs requested by defendant are rejected

there

is

no

legal

or

equitable

basis

for

such

reimbursement.
47.

Other items of personal property on Exhibit No. 26

are as follows:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

All defendant's financial records left at
plaintiff's residence—including but not
limited to the following: 1990 tax return
and all supporting documents; 1991 tax records
of defendant; 1991 First Interstate Bank
statements/checks/deposits; and 1992 First
Interstate Bank statements/checks/deposits
prior to the parties1 separation
Wig base for defendant's wig block.
Two large turntables and round wooden cutting
board with handle.
Navy blue ski sweater (expensive woolen)
Navy tennis sweater (button front)
New ice bucket
Bathroom scales
Meat rack (never used)
All defendant's tools
Wok and round wok base
Fondue dish and serving dishes in bright
colored metal
Defendant's sister's two larger family
portraits in gold ornate frames 2' x 4' in size
Stainless steel coffee server and tray
Brown wicker bedroom lamp
Double hibachi (electric)
18 \ tall yellow blown glass vase given to
defendant by her sister before sister's death
Cutting board, tray and utensils to Weber
cooking
Yellow metal mug rack and yellow taper candle
holder with mugs with "Love" on each cup given
to defendant by her daughter for Mother's Day
Roll of quilted covering for tabletop to play
cards on (new, still in original plastic bag,
never used)
2 f oak and copper pot rack
Yellow water repellant hooded jacket
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48.

To the extent that items 1 to 21 on Exhibit 26 are

in plaintifffs possession, they should be returned.
49.

The defendant expended certain sums prior to the

marriage of the parties for the benefit of the defendant.
50.

Plaintiff has requested that he be reimbursed from

defendant for certain sums which he paid on behalf of the defendant
prior to the marriage.

These were identified in his testimony as

medical treatment for defendant, paying off defendant's obligation
to Chase Visa, a medical bill at Cottonwood Center and the purchase
of a wedding ring for the defendant.

The Court finds that these

expenditures were gifts from the plaintiff to the defendant and to
the extent that plaintiff seeks reimbursement or credit in some
other fashion for those amounts, that claim is rejected by the
Court.
51.
plaintiff

on

Defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees from
the

basis

that

she

is

in

need

of

assistance

financially to meet those attorney's fee obligations and that the
plaintiff has the ability to assist her in connection therewith.
The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff ought to be required to
assist the defendant in meeting her attorney's fee obligation not
only for the reasons suggested by the defendant, that is her need
and the plaintiff's ability to pay, but based upon the unreasonable
approach that the plaintiff has taken to the resolution of this
case.
Plaintiff's suggestion that the parties should be
required to merely take what they brought into the marriage and
18

walk away with no further financial obligation, between them is
disingenuous. This is particularly true in view of the aggressive
nature of the courting of the defendant by plaintiff and his
promises

to

her

to

induce

her

to

enter

into

the

marital

relationship. While fault for the deterioration of the marriage is
not an issue in this case, the Court is satisfied that for whatever
reasons only known to the plaintiff, he apparently had second
thoughts after the marriage regarding the propriety of his original
conduct, and that for the most part caused the dissolution of the
relationship between the parties.
Defendant is effectively without any substantial
assets except the condominium in Arizona which provides her with no
positive cash flow. She is without funds with which to pay for the
costs of her attorney in this action.

Plaintiff has assets in

excess of $500,000 and the Court finds that defendant is in need
for payment of her attorney's fees and plaintiff has the financial
ability to meet those fees.
52.

The Court finds that the attorney's fees testified

bo by Mr. Dart in this case are reasonable in amount and were
necessarily incurred in this case and that the plaintiff should be
required to pay to the^defendant for the use and benefit of her
attorney the sums proffered by Mr. Dart at the conclusion of the
evidence in this case. The Court determines those attorney's fees
:o be $6,565, the amount still due Mr. Dart after partial payment
jy the defendant herein.

The Court further determines that the

iefendant is entitled to reimbursement of her legitimate costs
19

incurred in this matter and as reflected in the exhibit attached to
defendant's Exhibit D-34, in the total amount of $592.47.
53.

The Court anticipates each party may have some

dissatisfaction with this ruling and for that reason counsel for
each of the parties is to be involved in the drafting of these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which have put into effect
the decision this Court has contained in its Memorandum Decision.
The Court would request that Mr. Dart take the responsibility for
the initial draft to be supplemented by Mr. Mitsunaga, particularly
on the issue where Mr. Mitsunaga7s client has prevailed, to wit:
the issue of premarital property and the issue of reimbursement for
personal property which the defendant brought into the marriage and
which was given away or sold during the marriage.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of

Divorce from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and
entry.
2.

Each of the parties is awarded any items of property

which he or she had at the time of the marriage of the parties free
of any claim of the other.
3.

Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the

sum of $1,000 a month until such time as defendant should remarry,
cohabit or the death of either party.
20

4.

Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in the sum of

$6,565 and costs in the amount of $592.47.
5.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents and

perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of
Divorce when entered.
DATED this

j % day Q£

Qrti&Aj., 1993.

fUJIAAtfW^

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Court Judge
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EXHIBIT "D"

^iKjKtlK/i

OnT..ta.J993

:

10/6/93
By

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
000OOO000

OTIS B. KIRK, JR.,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.
PEGGIE M. KIRK,

Civil No. 924901796DA

Defendant.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson
000OOO000

The above matter came on for trial on March 9 and March
23, 1993, before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge.
Prior to trial, the Court consolidated a companion case
wherein the plaintiff had filed a divorce as No. 924901796, and
treating the second filed lawsuit as a counterclaim in the original
surviving action.
The parties and witnesses having been duly sworn and
exhibits offered and received and the Court having heard oral
arguments of counsel and, having taken the matter under advisement
and having rendered a written memorandum decision on May 4, 1993
and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The parties are granted a Decree of Divorce, each

from the other, said Decree to become final upon entry.
2.

The plaintiff is awarded all of his premarital

property as his sole and separate property as follows:

Residence: 3518 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This is a resident structure with 1.25 acres.
It was purchased by the plaintiff and his deceased
wife in 1956 and fully paid off in 1980.

The

property is now encumbered by a construction loan
for approximately $59,000.00.
Strip of land: This is a one foot wide protection
strip granted by Salt Lake County and is adjacent
and contiguous to the lot upon which the residence
(paragraph 22(a) is situated and was purchased at
the same time.
Lewis contract: This is a real estate contract on
the sale of real property acquired by the plaintiff
and his deceased wife in 1966.

The real estate

contract was entered into December 5, 1980.
Pensions and retirement (Monthly):
(Legend: I, inherited from deceased wife, PMS,
premarital source)
Carpenter Union P/M/S

$

64.00

Boise Cascade P/M/S

676.00

U.S. West I

423.00

Dividends - Interest (Monthly):
Mountain American CU I

2.16

Putnam IRA P/M/S

158.65

Boise Cascade Supplemental Savings

631.40

U.S. Government Security (Jt)

465.00

00128

5.

Alliance Government Reserve (Jt)

2.30

6.

No. american Service Trusts

7.

Thomson Growth Fund

8.

AT&T I

4.04

9.

Ameritech I

8.20

162.50

(Jt)

0

10.

Bell Atlantic I

11.

Bell South I

12.

NYNEX

13.

Pactel I

7.42

14.

South West Bell

7.66

15.

U.S. West I

F.

11.34
7.42
11.37

41.38

Social Security:

1. Social Security P/M/S
G.
This

Valley bank checking
is

the

only

869.00
P/M/S

checking

account

plaintiff before and after the marriage.

used

by

the

Two

transfers were made by the plaintiff into
this checking account:
1.

December 7, 1990 - monies from deceased wife's
retirement

2.

$20,176.00

Feb. 1991 - monies from deceased wife's
retirement

$14,269.66

H.

Retirements, pensions & Stock (Exhibit 9):

1.

Mountain Credit Union I

2.

Putnam IRA P/M/S

3.

Putnam IRA Cash account

650.00
23,432.98

4.

Boise Cascade Supplemental
Retirement JT

5.

96,943.00

Franklin U.S. Government
Security Fund P/M/S

6.

U.S. government Securities North Am Service Trust P/M/S

7.

Alliance Government Reserve P/M/S

8.

Mainstay Family of Funds P/M/S

9.

Thomson Fund

10.

AT&T Stock I

35.6130 shares

11.

Ameritech I

26.440

"

12.

Bell Atlantic I

51.0970

"

13.

Bell South I

39.1420

"

14.

NYNEX

27.6860

"

15.

Pactel I

40.7050

"

16.

Southwest Bell I

29.3840

M

17.

U.S. West I

37.3090

"

18.

U.S. West I

68.000

"

19.

U.S. West I

I.

3.

31,745.00

252.00

"

Vehicles: (Inherited and pre-marital)
1.

1980 Chevrolet

2.

1981 Toyota

3.

1968 Nomad Trailer

4.

1975 Yamaha motorcycle

The defendant is awarded all of her premarital

property as her sole and separate property as follows:

cci:o

1.

2.

Household furniture and fixtures

3.

1983 Lincoln Continental Mark VI

4.

First Interstate, checking account
#21-28727-1

5.

4.

Condominium 7018 No. Barbados
in Phoenix, Arizona
Market Value

$80,000.00

66.53

First Interstate checking
#28-16407-7
Balance
"Peggie M. Kirk"
"Otis B. Kirk"

9,537.00

Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the

sum of $1,000 a month until such time as defendant should remarry,
cohabit or the death of either party.
5.

Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in the sum of

$6,565 and costs in the amount of $592.47.
6.

Each party is ordered as individual or trustees

under the Kirk Family Trust to execute tne necessary documents to
transfer ownership of the premarital assets to the respective
parties.
DATED this

/X

) , 1993.

day /f

•M^TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Distri^fexeSiirt Judge
,4&2^w^J>
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EXHIBIT "E"

First
Interstate
Bank

P>
First tnterstai
of Utah.

PEGGIE M JENNINGS TAYLOR
P 0 BOX 21126
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121

COMBINED STATEMENT
OF ACCOUNT
17 28 08

CHECKBOOK INTEREST
HILLSIDE PLAZA OFFICE
ACCOUNT 28 16407 7

JUNE 19, 1991
PAGE
2
5,388.37

BEGINNING BALANCE
4 DEPOSITS ( + )

2,679.73
1,886.08

17 CHECKS ( - )

.00

0 OTHER ( - )
INTEREST PAID ( + )

24.75
.00

SERVICE CHARGE ( - )
ENDING BALANCE

6,206.77

JUNE 1 9 , 1 9 9 1

DEPOSITS

mi

DATE

06/19

DESCRIPTION
DEPOSIT
SSA
DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT
INTEREST PAID

AMOUNT

1,244.00
454.00
200.00
781.73
24.75

DEPOSIT

CHECKS
DATE
05/20
06/19
06/03
05/31
06/07
06/06
06/11
06/04
06/04

'HECKT*!G
AN HINKLE OFFICE
CCOUNT 36 11544 2

NUMBER
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
723
724

AMOUNT
20.00
10.00
108.02
39.80
486.00
480.00
85.00
39.63
30.30

NUMBER
725
751
752
753
754
755
756
758

DATE
06/06
06/10
06/06
06/07
06/07
06/10
06/10
06/18

rc«>f\UARY

l-TT,

l 7

AMOUNT

16.72
185.96
30.51
2.45
2.74
81.95
250.00
17.00

7l

.00

0 DEPOSITS ( + )

.00

0 CHECKS ( - 0

.00

0 OTHER ( - )

.00

SERVICE CHARGE ( - )
ENDING BALANCE

.00

JUNE 19, 1991

.00

TRANSACTION DETAIL AND CANCELLED CHECKS FOR THIS ACCOUNT HILL BE MAILED
SEPARATELY ON THIS ACCOUNTS REGULAR STATEMENT DATE.

INTEREST PAID YTD

GET ACCOUNT INFORMATION DAY OR NIGHT HITH DAY £ NIGHT
BANC Br PHONE. SEE ENCLOSED BROCHURE FOR DETAILS.

.15

EXHIBIT "F"

First
Interstate
Bank

0
First Interstate Bank
of Utah, N.A.

EGGIE M KIRK
TIS B KIRK
HE KIRK FAMILY TRUST
0 BOX 21126
ALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
31 28 08
REFERRED CHECKING
ILLSIDE PLAZA OFFICE
CCOUNT 28 16407 7

FEBRUARY 21, 1993
PAGE
1
<•,, 9 9 4 . 0 1

BEGINN][NG BALANCE
2 DEPOSITS ( + )
31 CHECKS

1 ,496.00

(-)

2 ,282.55

0 OTHER C-)

.00

INTEREST PAID C+)

7.78
.00

SERVICE CHARGE ( - )
ENDING BALANCE

FEBRUARY 2 1 ,

4 ,215.24

1993

DEPOSITS
DATE
02/03
02/08
02/19

DESCRIPTION
SSA
DEPOSIT
INTEREST PAID

AMOUNT
496.00
1,000.00
7.78

DEPOSIT

CHECKS
DATE
02/11
01/22
01/21
01/25
01/26
01/27
02/01
02/05
02/05
02/02
02/03
02/02
02/03
02/03
02/10
02/04

NUMBER
459
460
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
471
472
473
474
475
476

AMOUNT
32.09
49.95
8.87
150.00
69.06
37.30
25.00
488.74
100.00
550.00
74.25
30.22
&.52
25.00
35.00
8.77

DATE
02/08
02/09
02/09
02/10
02/11
02/11
02/12
02/16
02/16
02/18
02/18
02/19
02/18
02/19
02/19

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation • Member Federal Reserve System
DOA-na(8-»t) NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

NUMBER

477
478
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
489
490
491
492
493

AMOUNT
17.00
25.00
12.74
13.76
5.00
100.00
184.42
13.76
32.00
9.71
22.72
19.51
105.00
8.20
24.96

K- ^

HJ

First
Interstate
Bank

First Interstate Bank
of Utah. N.A.

PEGGIE M KIRK
P 0 BOX 21126
SALT LAKE CITY, UT

84121
0 21 09

CHECKING
MURRAY OFFICE
ACCOUNT 21 28727 1

FEBRUARY 22, 1993
PAGE
1
BEGINNING BALANCE

3,133.98

1 DEPOSIT ( + )
0 CHECKS
0 OTHER

627.66
.00

(-)

.00

(-)

SERVICE CHARGE C-)
ENDING BALANCE

.00
FEBRUARY 2 2 , 1993

3,761.64

DEPOSITS
DATE
01/29

DESCRIPTION
DEPOSIT

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation • Member Federal Reserve System
.14a (8*U NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT iMPnomLTiruj

AMOUNT
627.66

EXHIBIT "G"

fa^bllo0}

STATEMENT OF MONTHLY EXPENSES
PEGGIE TAYLOR-KIRK

Rent, Salt Lake City

$550

Electricity

45

Mountain Fuel

35

Water, sewer, garbage

25

Telephone

52

Food and household supplies
Lunches out

225
50

Clothing (included in VISA payment below)
Dry cleaning/laundry

10

Automobile insurance

50

Automobile gas, oil, repairs, maintenance

250

Medical and Rx

100

Dental
Health insurance (anticipated after divorce—FHP)

30
100

Business expenses/licensing

85

Business schools/seminars

40

Entertainment

100

Vacation/travel (Annual trip to Hawaii to visit
daughter; occasional travel to Phoenix)

125

Personal grooming

35

Gifts/Christmas

55

Miscellaneous and incidentals
VISA payment
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES

125
100
$2,287

EXHIBIT "H"

\i

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

NO. & /
STATEMENT OF MONTHLY INCOME
PEGGIE TAYLOR-KIRK

Income (From 1992 Tax Return)
Income from earnings (net after expenses)
$3,068 annual
Social Security
Rental income:

$256
496

Arizona condo

Gross before expenses

$700

Less:
Mortgage payment
Assessment—$425/year
Condo association
Property management
Maintenance/repairs $1,186

(487)
(35)
(85)
(56)
X99I

Net Rental Income/Loss
Alimony
TOTAL INCOME BEFORE TAXES

(62)
1.000
$1,690

Less Taxes (per E.J. Passey analysis):
Federal income tax—$619/year
Self-employment tax—$438/year
NET EXPENDABLE MONTHLY INCOME
with alimony at $1,000 per month

(52)
(36)
$1,602

EXHIBIT T*

\t DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
PEGGIE KIRK ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS RECAP

NO. § y

Services Rendered:
Mr. Dart —

42.75 hours at $175/hour

Mr. Sheaffer —
Ms. Clark —

$ 7 , 4 8 1 ,.25
1 8 0 . 00

1.80 hours at $100/hour

1/ 4 4 3 . 75

19.25 hours at $ 75/hour

Paralegal Services —

1/ 5 3 2 .,50

30.65 hours at $50/hour

$10"7637^750

Total Services Rendered:
Costs Advanced:
Filing fee - Complaint
Service fee for Complaint, TRO and OSC
Filing fee - Answer and Counterclaim
Deposition of Otis Kirk & copy of deposition
of Peggie Kirk
Recording fee - Lis Pendens
Copies
Postage
Hand Deliveries
FAX copies
Total Costs Advanced:

$

8 2 .,00
31,,00
60, . 0 0
247 . 4 5
8 .00
68 . 2 0
5 .32
52 . 5 0
38 . 0 0

Total Services and Costs:

T~ T9T.741
$n , 2 2 9 . 9 7

Less Retainer Paid 4/22/92

( i , 0 0 0 . 00)

Less Payments to Date:
6/24/92
7/22/92
8/12/92
10/2/92
10/29/92
12/1/92
12/23/92
2/23/93
Tota-1 Balance Due:

262.65
233.77
1,190.05
56.25
412.65
396.70
987.85
125.00
$ 6,565.05

